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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
Steven V. Jasso,
Petitioner-Respondent,
V.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO
a political Subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent-Appellant

Curtis and Carnie Gorringe,
husband and wife,
Petitioner-Respondent
V.
CAMAS COUNTY,
A political Subdivision of the
State of Idaho
Respondent-Appellant
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SUPREME COURT CASE NO.
37258-2010

CLERKS RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the 5th Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Camas
VOLUME II
HONORABLE ROBERT J. ELGEE DISTRICT JUDGE
Paul Fitzer
950 W. Bannock
Suite 520
Boise, Id 83702

James Phillips
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Id. 83333

Benjamin Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Id 83340

Paul J. Fitzer
Jill S. Holinka
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
ISB Nos.: 5675,6563
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com
jsh@msbtlaw.com

Attorneys for Respondents
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN JASSO,
&

Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV
2009-15

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD

Petitioners,
v.
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the state ofIdaho,
Respondent.

State ofIdaho
County of Camas

)
) ss.
)

Dwight Budin, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows:

AFFIDA VIT OF DWIGHT BUT LIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 1

1.

My name is Dwight Butlin. I am over the age of 18 years, and I am of sound

mind. The statements I make in this affidavit are made upon my own personal knowledge and
are true to the best of my knowledge.
2.

I am the Planning and Zoning Administrator for Camas County.

As such, I

maintain a record of: (a) all land use ordinances for Camas County, including the Camas County
Subdivision Ordinance; and (b) all international codes adopted by Camas County, including the
International Fire Code.
3.

At the time the Fricke Creek Application was filed, in June 2008, Camas County

had duly adopted the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code.

Camas County uses the

International Fire Code, including its appendixes, in its review of subdivision applications.
Though the provisions in the appendixes are not mandatory, the County regularly utilizes and
relies on the provisions in the appendixes when considering subdivision applications.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code.

This is a true and correct copy of the entire Appendix D existing at the time of the Fricke Creek
Application in June 2008.
5.

Camas County regularly utilizes the guidelines in Appendix D in its review of

subdivision applications, including the Fricke Creek Application.
Further this affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this 1st day of July, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 2

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _'_'_ _ day of July, 2009.

/~ot~ublic for idah~,
/

ResIdmg at:
£.1 tp/ d
My cornmissio-'-n"""ex..u.~q-Ir<-<es.-L-:-----;-[-,-I-'i-~-02-c-/-,
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APPENDIX D

FIRE APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS
The provisions contained in this appendix are not mandatory unless specifically referenced in the adopting ordinance.

SECTION 0101
GENERAL
DIOl.l Scope. Fire apparat~s access roads shall be in accordance with this appendix and all other applicable requirements
of the International Fire Code.

DI03.3 Turning radius. The minimum turning radius shall be
determined by the fire code official.
DI03.4 Dead ends. Dead-end fire apparatus access roads in
excess of 150 feel (45720 mm) shall be provided with width
and turnaround provisions in accordance with Table DI03.4.
TABLE 0103.4
REQUIREMENTS FOR DEAD-END FIRE
APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS
'-~LE~N-G~T-H-''-'-W-ID-TH---'I---

SECTION 0102
REQUIRED ACCESS

DI02.1 Access and loading. Facilities, buildings or portions
of buildings hereafter constructed shall be accessible to fIre
department apparatus by way of an approved fire apparatus
access road with an asphalt, concrete or other approved driving
surface capable of supporting the imposed load of fIre apparatus weighing at least 75,000 pounds (34 050 kg).

;;

(feet)

~J

TURNAROUNDS REQUIRED

(feet)

r----.--~------~------

I

0-150

20

None required

151-500

20

120-foot Hammerhead, 6O-fool "Y" orl
%-fool-diarneler cul-de-sac in
I
accordance with Figure 0103.1
I

~------~-------T--------------~------~--~

!

SECTION 0103
MINIMUM SPECIFICATIONS
DI03.1 Access road width with a hydrant. Where a fire
hydrant is located on a fire apparatus access road, the minimum
road width shall be 26 feet (7925 mm). See Figure D103.1.

DI03.2 Grade. Fire apparatus access roads shall not exceed 10
percent in grade.
Exception: Grades steeper than 10 percent as approved by
the fire chief.

120-fool Hammerhead, 6O-fool "Y" or i
!96-fool-diameler cul-de-sac in
accordance with Figure 0103.1
I

50I-75~Oi_=
26

i

Ov~r:.;50~~cia~proval required __ ~
For SI:

1 foot = 304.8 mm.

D103.5 Fire apparatus access road gates. Gates securing the
fire apparatus access roads shall comply with all of the following criteria:
1. The minimum gate width shall be 20 feet (6096 rnm).

.

- 96'
2S'R
TYP.'

-28'R
TYP.'

20'

26'SO' "Y"

96' DIAMETER
CUL-DE-SAC
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60',
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1
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. 26'

120' HAMMERHEAD

For Sf:

I foot

304.8 mm

28' RTYP.'

20,3

28'R-~
TYP.'

60'

MINIMUM CLEARANCE
AROUND A FIRE
HYDRANT

20'
ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO 120' HAMMERHEAD
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APPENDIX 0

2. Gates shall be of the swinging or sliding type .

DI04.2 Buildings exceeding 62,000 square feet in area.
Buildings or facilities having a gross building area of more than
62,000 square feet (5760 m 2) shall be provided with two separate and approved fire apparatus access roads.

3. Construction of gates shall be of materials that allow
manual operation by one person.
4. Gate components shall be maintained in an operative
condition at all times and replaced or repaired when
defective.

Exception: Projects having a gross building area of up to
124,000 square feet (II 520 m2 ) that have a single approved
fue apparatus access road when all buildings are equipped
throughout with approved automatic sprinkler systems.

5. Electric gates shall be equipped with a means of opening
the gate by fire department personnel for emergency
access. Emergency opening devices shall be approved
by the fire code official.

DI04.3 Remoteness. Where two access roads are required,
they shall be placed a distance apart equal to not less than one
half of the length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension
of the property or area to be served, measured in a straight line
between accesses.

6. Manual opening gates shall not be locked with a padlock
or chain and padlock unless they are capable of being
opened by means of forcible entry tools or when a key
box containing the keyes) to the lock is installed at the
gate location.

I

7. Locking device specifications shall be submitted for
approval by the fire code official.

SECTION 0105
AERIAL FIRE APPARATUS ACCESS ROADS

DI03.6 Signs. Where required by thf! fire code official, fire
apparatus access roads shall be marted with permanent NO
PARKING-FIRE LANE signs c mplying with Figure
DI03.6. Signs shall have a minimum imension of 12 inches
(305 mm) wide by 18 inches (457 rum) high and have red letters on a white reflective background. Signs shall be posted on
one or both sides of the fue apparatus road as required by Section D103 .6.1 or D103.6.2.
SIGN TYPE "A"

SIGN TYPE "C"

SIGN TYPE "0"

NO
PARKING

NO
PARKING

NO
PARKING

FIRE LANE

FIRE LANE

FIRE LANE

~. 12"-1

~ 12" -~

~-- 12" ~

... ...

DI0S.1 Where required. Buildings or portions of buildings or
facilities exceeding 30 feet (9144 rum) in height above the lowest level of fire department vehicle access shall be provided
with approved fire apparatus access roads capable of accommodating fire department aerial apparatus. Overhead utility
and power lines shall not be located within the aerial fire apparatus access roadway.
DI0S.2 Width. Fire apparatus access roads shall have a minimum unobstructed width of 26 feet (7925 mm) in the immediate vicinity of any building or portion of building more than 30
feet (9144 mm) in height.

T
18"

DI0S.3 Proximity to building. At least one of the required
access routes meeting this condition shall be located within a
minimum of 15 feet (4572 mm) and a maximum of 30 feet
(9144 mm) from the building, and shall be positioned parallel
to one entire side of the building.

J

FIGURE 0103.6
FIRE LANE SIGNS

SECTION 0106
MULTIPLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS

DI03.6.1 Roads 20 to 26 feet in width. Fire apparatus
access roads 20 to 26 feet wide (6096 to 7925 nun) shall be
posted on both sides as a fue lane.
D103.6.2 Roads more than 26 feet in width. Fire apparatus access roads more than 26 feet wide (7925 mm) to 32
feet wide (9754 mrn) shall be posted on one side of the road
as a fue lane.

SECTION 0104
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS
DI04.1 Buildings exceeding three stories or 30 feet in
height. Buildings or facilities exceeding 30 feet (9144 mm) or
three stories in height shaH have at least three means of fire
apparatus access for each structure.
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DI06.1 Projects having more than 100 dwelling units. Multiple-family residential projects having more than 100 dwelling units shall be equipped throughout with two separate and
approved fue apparatus access roads.
Exception: Projects having up to 200 dwelling units may
have a single approved fue apparatus access road when all
buildings , including nonresidential occupancies, are
equipped throughout with approved automatic sprinkler
systems installed in accordance with Section 903.3.1.1 or
903 .3. 1.2.
DI06.2 Projects having more than 200 dwelling units. Multiple-family residential projects having more than 200 dwcll ing units shall be provided with two separate and approved fire
apparatus access roads regardless of whether they are equipped
with an approved automatic sprinkler system.
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APPENDIX D

SECTION 0107
ONE- OR TWO-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENTS
DI07.1 One- or two-family dwelling residential developments. Developments of one- or two-family dwellings where
the number of dwelling units exceeds 30 shall be provided with
separate and approved fIre apparatus access roads and shall
meelilie requirements of Section DI04.3.
~

Exceptions:
1. Where there are more than 30 dwelling units on a single public or private fIre apparatus access road and all
dwelling units are equipped throughout with an
approved automatic sprinkJer system in accordance
with Section 903 .3.1.1, 903.3.1.2 or 903.3 .1.3.3,
access from two directions shall not be required.
2. The number of dwelling units on a single fIre apparatus access road shall not be increased unless fIre apparatus access roads will connect with future
development, as determined by the fIre code official.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333

~

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

7

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 4
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I
JAMES W. PHILLIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
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ISB # 1520

Attorneys for Petitioner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IbF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Petitioner,
vs.
AUGMENT RECORD
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
}
)
)

Consolidated
Case NoS. CV-2009-l4
and CV-2009-15

r

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSI~ION TO
RESPONDENT'S
MOTIbN
TO
AUGMENT RECORD

)
}
)
)

)

--------.----------------------))
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,
Petitioners,
vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,
Respondent

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named petltione~,
by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark Law Fi 1m, hls
attorneys of record, and files this memorandum in oppositiot to the
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
HOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1
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Respondent's Motion to Augment The Record filed on July 1,12009.
The Petitioner objects to the motion on the following grou~dS:
1. Appendix D of the International Fire Code (If I~C") was
not part of the Agency Record prepared and filed by theiAgency
under IRCP Rule 84; there is no reason given for the assert~on now
that it should be part of the record or why it was not incl~ded by
the County in its record of the proceedings; and, it liS not
properly admissible based on the Affidavit Of Dwight But-lin In
I

Support Of Respondent's Motion To Augment Record.
2. Proof of adoption of the IFC by Camas County can only
be accomplished by filing of a certified copy of the ordinance

or~kinan~e

adopting same, which in this case is stated to be Zoning
152. Similarly, proof of consideration of the IFC by Camas County
with regard to the Fricke Creek subdivision application ca not be
established by the mere assertion thereof in the Affidavit of
Dwight Butlin, which affidavit is not part of the reJord of
proceedings with regard to the Decision under judicial
DATED

thiS.~~

day of July, 2009.
THE ROARK AW FIRM,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2

re~iew.
~ I

LMVV r 1 n.lvi

r fit. n I), L U0 I

;" UU4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the ~ day of July, 2009, I
foregoing document to the following:
Jill S. Holinka
Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucker Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, 1D 83702
Via Fax: 208-331-1202
attorney for Camas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum 1D 83340
Via Fax: 208-622-2755
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

Dated:

7 -{fJ7:E!:1.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 3

dOL.{

the

Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c.
371-A Walnut Avenue North
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 622-6699
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116
benworst@cox.net
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

*****
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

)

Consolidated Cases:

)

Petitioner,

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-14
Case No. CV-2009-15

)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

)
)
)

Respondent.

)

IRCP 84(1)

)
)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, husband
and wife,

)
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

v.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

)
)
)

Respondent.

)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT - 1

;;)00

COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of
record, and submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Motion to Augment
objecting to such augmentation for the following reasons:
1.

Camas County has provided no proof that such Fire Code and Appendix were ever duly
adopted by the County. The Butlin Affidavit provides nothing more than Mr. Butlin's
assurance t.hat such Code was duly adopted while the Motion to Augment indicates that such
code was adopted by Camas County in its Zoning Ordinance.

2.

Camas County provides no explanation why it failed to include this document as part of
the agency record in this action even though Camas County is the agency legally obligated to
prepare the entire record in a timely manner.
Nonetheless, Gorringes hereby consent to augmentation of the record with the addition of

the applicable Zoning Ordinance; however, Camas County must still demonstrate that such Code
and Appendix are an integral part of such Zoning Ordinance.

ck..

DATED this

II day of

(J=:~

(1

,2009.

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c.
Attorney At Law

enjamin W. Worst,
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT· 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

fl

~

I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on this
day of if:;:~
, 2009, I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 0
OSITION TO CAMAS
COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq.
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~ Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

Mr. Patrick Dunn
35211 Palmeter Lane SE
Snoqualmie, Washington 98065

(~U.S.

Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile: ( ) _ _ _ __

James W. Phillips
The Roark Law Firm
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 788-3918

0/J

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e.
Attorney At Law

By:

'
/

Benjamin W. Worst

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO AUGMENT· 3
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Paul 1. Fitzer ISB #5675
Jill S. Holinka ISB #6563
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TL'RCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law

950 W. Bru.mock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
ISB Nos.: 5675,6563
Email: pjf@msbtltrW.com
jsh@msbtlaw.com
Attorneys for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN JASSO,
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV

&

2009-15

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
Petitioners,

RESPONSE

v.
CAMAS COUNTY~ a political subdivision of

the state of Idaho,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the Respondent" Camas County ("County"), by and through its
undersigned counsel of record, the law timl of Moore Smith Buxton & TUfcke, Chtd., and

hereby submits its Response.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the consolidated Petitions for Judicial Review of
Petitioners Stephen Jasso ("Jasso") and Curtis and Carnie Gon-inge l ("Gon-inge"). The subject
of the Petitions is Camas County's approval of an application for subdivision and preliminary
plat-the so-called "Fricke Creek Subdivision"- filed by Patrick Dunn.

Petitioners allege

numerous procedural and legal errors in the County's approval of the Subdivision and therefore
request that the approval be set aside. Petitioners further allege that the County acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law in approving the subdivision, entitling them to attorney fees and
costs under Idaho Code §12-117,

The County submits that its review and approval of the

Subdivision was reasonable and does not entitle Petitioners to the relief requested.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIE\V
The Idall0 Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A) governs the review of local land use
decisions. 2 The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on questions of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. 3 Camas County (acting
through the Planning and Zoning Board and the Board of Adjustment) is treated as an
administrative agency for purpose of judicial review. 4 As to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency, The
Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; and the agency's
factual detelminations are binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the detenninations are supported by evidence in the
1

2

:;
4

Jasso and Goninge are sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Petitioners."
Price v. Payette County Ed O/County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998).
I.e. 67-5279(1); Stevenson v. Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9 P.3d 1222. 1225 (2000)
Stevenson v Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9 P.3d 1222, 1225 (2000)

BRIEF - 2

IVIVVI\ L

,)IVi 1

~

II

U UI\ I

Vl~

11V. 'tUj I

r.

'I

record. S Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including
a board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. 6
A Board's decision may only be overtumed where its findings: (a) violate statutory or
constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon
unlav.ful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence; or (e) are arbitrary,
capricious. or an abuse of discretion. 7 The party attacking a zoning board's action must first
illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and then must show that a substantial
right of the party has been prejudiced. 8

III.
ISSUES

Jasso and Gorringe raise identical issues in their Petitions and in their Opening Briefs 9 ;
1.
Whether the proposed access road to the Subdivision constitutes a
"cul-de-sac street" more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article 4,
Section C.7 of the Subdivision Ordinance;

2.
Whether approval of the Subdivision creates an access road across
the Jasso and Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of
the Subdivision Ordinance;
3.
'Whether Mr. Dunn's application contained required infonnation
relating to flood plains;

4.
Wl1ether the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
fail to satisfy the requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by
Idaho Code §67-6535(b); and
>Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v Bd. ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,554,976 P.2d 477,480
(1999).
6 Cowan v. Bd. ojComm'rs ofFremom County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 PJd 1247, 1254 (2006).
7 I.e 67-5279 (3)(a)-(e). See also Payme River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board ofComm 'rs of Valley County, 132
IdallO 551,554,976 P.2d 477,480 (1999)
s Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254.
9 In light of the Court's order bifurcating the issues of law and fact, the Opening Briefs do not address other issues
raised in the Petitions, viz. adequate notice, compliance with the Camas County Comprehensive Plan, and
consideration of the availability of public services to the property.

BRIEF - 3
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5.
\\r11ether the COlmty's approval of the preliminary plat application
was without a reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of
attorney fees to Jasso and Gorringe under Idaho Code §12-117(1).
The County submits that its approval of the Subdivision was reasonable-and not
arbitrary or capricious-for numerous reasons.

IV.
ANALYSIS

A.

Hammer Head Access Road vs. Cul-de-Sac
Petitioners assert that the applicant's (Patrick Dunn) subdivision application did not

comply with the County's Article IV, Section C(7) prohibiting cul~de-sac streets over 500 feet in
length.

This code provision is inapplicable to this application. The Petitioners incorrectly

assUme that the only legally available type of dead-end street is a cul-de-sac.

While it is

certainly true that a cul-de-sac cannot exceed five hundred feet, there are several other available
dead-end access roads available and routinely utilized in the County including 96' cuI de sac's,
120' hammerhead's, 60' "Y" dead ends pursuant to the International Fire Code adopted by the
County via Ordinance #160. Further, Article IV, Section C(3) specifically provides for Stub
Streets where it is anticipated, like here, that future connectivity may (not shall) be a viable
option.
In considering the application here, both the Board of Commissioners Cthe Board") and
the County Planning & Zoning Commission ("the Commission") were concerned about the
access road and whether it satisfied all applicable requirements of the County Code. The Board
ultimately concluded the hammerhead design was appropriate and would best serve fire safety
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and snow removal issues, 10 Pursuant to Camas County Ordinance #160 the County has adopted
Appendix D of the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code which provides for an access road
in the foml of a Hammerhead design to be utilized in lieu of other "dead-end" streets including a
cul-de-sac road, Thus, the Petitioners' assertion that the applicant's subdivision application did
not comply with Article IV, Section C(7) prohibiting cul-de-sac streets over 500 feet in length is
irrelevant as the street in dispute is an access road and not a cul-de-sac at all. The hammerhead
is in compliance with the applicable ordinances as a "dead-end" street at greater than 750 feet in
length is pennitted.

B.

Access to a Public Road
Petitioners assert that the applicant's subdivision does not comply with Article IV,

Section C(9) which prohibits private roads except within PlalIDed Unit Developments.
Petitioners nusinterpret this ordinance. Article IV, Section C(9) of Camas COlmty's Subdivision
Ordinance pertains to the "Design Standards" within a subdivision. Thus it pertains to the roads
,vithin the proposed subdivision. The evidence clearly provides that all roads within the Dunn'
subdivision are in fact public roads.
The Petitioners' interpretation of the provision would, if enforced by the County, be an
ultra-vires act. While the County can of course require all roads within a proposed subdivision
to be dedicated to the public, it could not require an applicant to dedicate property not his own
and outside of his subdivision to the public as well.

Yet, this is exactly what Petitioners

advocate; that the road that connects the Dunn property to Baseline Road must also be dedicated
10 The Board's Findings reflect that the issue ofrhe road design was considered by the Commission at its meetings
of August 19, 2008 and September 2, 2008. The Board considered the issue at its January 12, 2009 meeting and
remanded the issue back to the Commission for further consideration. The Commission again considered the road
design (in particular the hammerhead design) at its February 3, 2009 meeting. The Board considered the
Commission's recomm.endation on February 23,2009 and approved the Subdivision with the hammerhead design.
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to the public by the applicant. The applicant does not possess this power and to enforce such
requirement would preclude all property owners from exercising their constitutional right to
develop one's property except for those fortunate property owners whose property happens to
already abut a public road.
This is not what the subdivision ordinance contemplates or requires. The applicable
ordinance to this application is Article V, Section B(l) which only requires that a proposed
subdivision have access to a public road; i.e. a landlocked subdivision is precluded, The Board
held that the Subdivision would be required to access a public road (Baseline Road) as a
condition of approval before building permits, certificates of occupancy, etc could be issued as
required by the Subdivision Ordinance. The two provisions, while seemingly contradictory,
actually together to require internal subdivision streets under the property owner's control to be
public but allow the use of private roads, easements, etc. to access main thoroughfares. The
validity of said private roads, easements, etc. is a condition of approval and the responsibility of
the property owner to ensure.

C.

Adjudication of Easements is not within the authority of a County
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, the Board did not conclude that the easement did or

did not constitute a "private road." Whether the easement in question supports the amount and
type of use contemplated by Mr. Dunn is a private matter appropriately left for negotiation and
discussion between Mr. Dunn, Mr. Jasso and the Gorringes and possibly subject to a potential
declarative judgment action. A petition for judicial review is not the appropriate venue for such
a dispute since the only remedy is to remand the matter back to the County. The County is
simply not empowered to sit as an arbiter or interpreter of private agreements such as the legal
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nature of CCR' s, private vs. public easements, etc. The County is only empowered to condition
its approval on the applicant's compliance with Article V, Section B(l). (To be eligible for a
building pennit, celtificate of occupancy, etc. the subdivision must have access to a public road.)
If in a declarative judgment action between the two private parties after submission of evidence,
the court detenllines that the private contract between the parties contemplates only a limited
private easement, then the applicant does not comply with the County's condition of approval
and a certificate of occupancy cannot be issued. Such evidence pertaining to a private dispute is
not codified in the County record, nor is a county board empowered to make such an
adjudication. Thus, the County's conditional of approval requiring access to a public road is just
that, a condition precedent to a building peIDlit. Such a requirement is in compliance and does
not conflict with any applicable County ordinances.

D.

Flood Plain
The Plaintiff contends that the subdivision does not comply with Article VI, Section H

which requires that "any proposed subdivision that is located within a floodplain" is thereafter
subject to the myriad of additional floodplain requirements, Quite simply, as FEMA has not, as
yet, adopted a floodplain map for this area, the County is not empowered to subject an applicant
to these requirements. There is no evidence in the record demonstrating that this subdivision is
located in the floodplain, nor could their be as an official FEMA map has not yet been adopted.
Once FEMA adopts said map, many such properties may fall within the floodplain, but
Petitioners are putting the cart before the horse as the County cannot condition approval on legal
standards that, while codified in the Ordinance, are not as yet applicable.

The limit to the

County's authority at this juncture is as provided in the approved plat which identifies the
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location of Fricke Creek and specifies that building envelopes must be at least 200' from the
creek. Upon remand, the County may specifically provide in its findings that no FEMA as yet
exists.

E.

Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law
Petitioners object to the County's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.

While the

County agrees that "[c]onc1usory statements are not sufficient", the County contends that it did
provide a clear statement of what, specifically) [the County] believes ... " and its rationale."

Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P. 3d 1247 (2006). For example, the County
specifically addressed the hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county
specifications and approved by the Road and Bridge Department. The County believes that
Petitioners' objection lies in the County's alleged failure to render its judgment interpreting the
nature of the easement. Again, the County is not empowered to render such conclusions of law.
The Calmty is limited to and did specifically address that the easement must comply with the
applicable code provisions providing the subdivision access to a public road. (i.e. Baseline).
These were the "criteria and standards it considered relevant, ... [v.rith] detailed facts, and ...
rational for its decision." ld.

F.

Attornev Fees

Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees as
from the very beginning, the Petitioner advised the County that the ... plat did not
comply with the County' 5 subdivision ordinance ... so their can be no claim .. of
an illllOcent oversight, misunderstanding, or error when the Board approved the
subdivision. Literally, the COlUlty ignored the Petitioner'S objections and, in so
doing, forced him to file this Petition for Judicial Review.
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The County did not ignore and did not via innocent oversight fail to address the subdivision
ordinance. The County provided an in depth analysis of said provisions. The misunderstanding
and legal error was on the part of the Petitioners, As provided, their "advice" amounted to an
ultra-vires act. Petitioners wish merely to prevent its neighbor from exercising its constitutional
property right in subdividing its property as provided by law. To require a property owner to
dedicate property not his own to the public is an ultra-vires act. Petitioners refuse to read the two
provisions in conjunction with one another ... (1) that their can be no private roads within the
subdivision itself, i,e. the property which the applicant and the County have the power to control
must all be public; and (2) the property ul1der the owner's control must have access, at some
point, to a public road. i.e. the property cannot be completely landlocked accessible by air alone.
How the applicant accomplishes this is up to the applicant so long as he complies with these
provisions. Thus, Petitioners are not entitled to attorney fees as the County had a reasonable
basis to interpret its ordinances as such and the Petitioners objections are simply unreasonable.

V.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Camas County respectfully requests this Court deny the
Petitions for Judicial Review as a matter of law.
DATED this 20 th day of July, 2009.
MOORE SMITH BU TON & TURCKE, CHTD.

By:............"".....:;~:::..-.--I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

COlTect

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1..:/ day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
copy of the foregoing RESPONSE by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:

James W. Phillips

Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333

Benjamin W. Worst

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
P,O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
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Hand-deliveled
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Hand-delivered

Paul J. Fitzer
Jill S. Holinka
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
ISB Nos.: 5675,6563
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com
jsh@msbtlaw.com
Attorneys for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH nmICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN JASSO,
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV
2009-15

&

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
Petitioners,

RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS'
OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the state ofldaho,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the Respondent, Camas County, by and through its undersigned counsel
of record, the law firm of Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd., and hereby submits its
Response to Petitioners' Objections to Motion to Augment Record.

The County filed its Motion to Augment Record on July 1, 2009, requesting that
Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code be included in the record. Petitioners object to
the County's Motion on the ground that the adopting ordinance was not included in the motion.

RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1

Nevertheless, Petitioners have consented to the requested augmentation, provided the adopting
ordinance is also made part of the record.
A certified copy of Ordinance 160, adopting the 2006 International Fire Code ("IFC"), is
attached as Exhibit A to the Second Affidavit of Dwight Butfin in Support of Motion to Augment
Record, filed contemporaneously herewith. The 2006 IFC and its appendices were considered
and applied by the County in its approval of the Subdivision.
DATED this 21 sl day of July, 2009.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

BY.]~~
Attorneys for Respondent

RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2

'.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 21stday of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTION TO MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST,
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

./

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered
Email

./

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered
Email

p.e.

RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' OBJECTIONS TO MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - 3

Paul J. Fitzer
Jill S. Holinka
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED
Attorneys at Law
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 331-1800
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202
ISB Nos.: 5675, 6563
Email: pjf@msbtlaw.com
jsh@msbtlaw.com

F!L;:::J
7-ZI-cR

Attorneys for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN JASSO,
Consolidated Case Nos.: CV 2009-14 & CV
2009-15

&

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD

Petitioners,

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the state of Idaho,
Respondent.

State of Idaho
County of Camas

)
) ss.
)

Dwight Butlin, being first duly sworn, sayeth as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 1

1.

My name is Dwight Butlin. I am over the age of 18 years, and I am of sound

mind. The statements I make in this affidavit are made upon my own personal knowledge and
are true to the best of my knowledge.
2.

I am the Planning and Zoning Administrator for Camas County.

As such, I

maintain a record of: (a) all land use ordinances for Camas County, including the Camas County
Subdivision Ordinance; and (b) all international codes adopted by Camas County, including the
International Fire Code.
3.

At the time the Fricke Creek Application was filed, in June 2008, Camas County

had duly adopted the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code. Camas County uses the
International Fire Code, including its appendixes, in its review of subdivision applications.
Though the provisions in the appendixes are not mandatory, the County regularly utilizes and
relies on the provisions in the appendixes when considering subdivision applications.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is Appendix D to the 2006 International Fire Code.

This is a true and correct copy of the entire Appendix D existing at the time of the Fricke Creek
Application in June 2008.
5.

Camas County regularly utilizes the guidelines in Appendix D in its review of

subdivision applications, including the Fricke Creek Application.
Further this affiant sayeth naught.
Dated this 1st day of July, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 2

Subscribed and sworn to before me this - - - day of July, 2009,

Motatf PUblic for Idah9
/
ReSl'd'mg at: f-~
a:!. , If -e: / ,j
My commission expires:

/ () - / '1 -...~ () / !

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

~
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Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered

AFFIDAVIT OF DWIGHT BUTLIN IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT RECORD - 4

EXHIBIT A
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ORDINANCE NO. 160
AN ORDINANCE OF CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, ADOPTING TIlE LATEST EDITION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL BUILDING CODE (IBC), THE INTERNATIONAL RESIDENTIAL
CODE (IRC), PARTS I-IV AND IX, THE INTERNATIONAL FIRE CODE, (IFC) AND THE
INTERNA TIONAL ENERGY CONSERVATION CODE; EXEMPTING RESIDENTIAL
DECKING AND FENCING FROM THE mc, THE IRC, THE IFC AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY CODE; PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF A RESIDENTIAL
STORAGE SHED; REQUIRING SNOW LOAD REQUIREMENTS TO BE ENGINEERED
FOR ALL DWELLINGS ANDIOR BUILDINGS REQUIRING A BUILDING PERMIT;
ESTABLISHING
REQUIREMENTS
FOR
PERMANENT
FOUNDATIONS
FOR
STRUCTURES USED AS A PERMANENT DWELLING;
REPEALING ALL
ORDINANCE(S) IN
CONFLICT;
PROVIDING
FOR CONFLICTS
OF LAW,
SEVERABILITY, SAVING PROVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of County Commissioners, Camas County, Idaho;

SECTION 1: Adoption and Election to Enforce the Latest Edition of the mc, IRC Parts
I-IV and IX, International Fire Code and the International Energy Conservation Code
A.
Code Adoption: That the approved editions of the following nationally recognized
codes as adopted by the State of Idaho or the Idaho Building Code Board, are the official
building codes of Camas County, Idaho except as provided in Section B;

International
International
International
International

Fire Code
Building Code
Residential Code, parts I-IV and IX
Energy Conservation Code

The adopted versions of the foregoing codes shall be deemed superseded by successive versions
of such codes as they are adopted by the Idaho Building Code Board effective on the date any
such codes are made effective by the Idaho Building Code Board and lor the State Fire Marshall.

B.

Amendments To Adopted Codes: That the following amendments shall be
applicable to the adopted building codes:
I. To the International Building Code:
a.
Section 101.1 shall be amended by inserting County of Camas
b.
Delete mc Sections 10 1.4.1 and 2701.1 for referenced
standard for electrical installation provisions, and any
reference to codes and standards dealing with electrical
installations which shall be governed by the codes and
standards as established by Idaho Code 54-1001
c.
Delete mc Sections 101.4.4 and 2901.1 for referenced
standard for plumbing installations which shall be governed by
the codes and standards as established by Idaho Code 54-260
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2. To the Intemational Residential Code. excepting Parts VII and VIII:
a.
Section RIO 1.1 shall be amended by inserting County of Camas
b.
Amend IRC Table R 30 1.2( I) Climate and Geographic Design
Criteria as established by the Building Official and set forth in
the Camas County building regulations.
c.
Amending Section R 301.2.3, Snow Loads to read as follows:
Roof Snow Load Requirements (for buildings that require a
Camas County building permit):
All structures must be engineered per IRC 301.2.3.
1)
3. To the Intemational Energy Conservation Code, as hereby amended:
a.
Amended IECC Section 101.1 inserting County of Camas
C.

Exemptions: These codes shall not apply to:
1. Residential decking (less than 30 inches from grade), and fencing less
than 6 feet in height, but shall remain subject to placement requirements
established by zoning regulations and;
2. Nothing herein shall act to eliminate the requirement of a building permit
for these structures.

SECTION 2: Requirements and Exemptions for Permanent Foundations for Structures
Used as a Permanent Dwelling:
A.
All structures used as a permanent dwelling shall be permanently affixed to a
permanent foundation and said foundation shall meet the building code requirements as set forth
in the International Residential Code and/or the building code as adopted by Camas County. The
requirement for permanent foundation dwelling structures shall not include recreational vehicles
or travel trailers.

SECTION 3: Repeal of Previous Ordinances: It is the intention of Camas County that
all prior ordinances and parts of ordinances in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.
SECTION 4: Conflicts of Law:
A.
These regulations are not intended to interfere with, abrogate or annul any other
ordinance, rule or regulation, statute or other provision of law. Where any provision of law,
whichever provisions are more restrictive or impose higher standards shall control.
These regulations are not inten<;led to abrogate any easement, covenant or any
B.
other private agreement or restriction; provided, that where the provisions of these regulations
are more restrictive or impose higher standards or regulations than such easement, covenant, or
other private agreement or restriction, the requirements of these regulations shall govern. Where
the provisions of the easement, covenant or private agreement or restriction impose duties and
obligation of these regulations or the determinations of the County in approving a subdivision or
in enforcing these regulations, and such private provisions are not consistent with these
regulations or determinations there under, then such private provisions shall be operative and

of' ~~s~~n~~J

supplemental to these regulations and determinations made there under but cannot be enforced
by the County.

SECTION 5: Severability:
If any part of any provision to these regulations or application thereof to any person or
circumstances is adjudged invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall be
confined in its operation to the part, provision, or application directly involved in all controversy
in which such judgment shall have been rendered and shall not affect or impair the validity of the
remainder of these regulations or the application thereof to other persons or circumstances. The
County hereby declares that it would have enacted the remainder of these regulations even
without any such part, provision or application.

SECTION 6: Saving Provisions:
These regulations shall not be construed as abating any action now pending under, or by
virtue of, prior existing subdivision regulations, or as discontinuing, abating, modifying, or
altering any penalty accruing or about to accrue, or as affecting the liability of any person, firm
or corporation, or as waiving any right of the municipality under any section or provision
existing at the time of adoption of these regulations, or as vacating or annulling any rights
obtained by any person, firm or corporation, by lawful action of the municipality except as shall
be expressly provided for in these regulations.

PASSED BY the Board of County Commissioners of Camas County, Idaho this 28 th day
of July, 2008.
CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
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Ken Backstfom, Chaiiman
ATTEST:

CAMAS COUNTY
RECORDED FOR:

CLERK

;2~~.
Rollie Berui.ett, County Clerk

8:22:46 am

07-29-2008

2008-081669
HO. PAGES: 3
fEE:
ROLlIE BEHHE!!
COUHIY CLERK
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JAMES W. PHILIJIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208/788-2427
ISB # 1520
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

}
)
)

Petitioner,

)
)

vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Consolidated
Case Nos. CV-2009-14
and CV-2009-1S
PETITIONER JASSO'S
REPLY

-------------------------------)
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,

)
)
)

petitioners,

)
)

vs.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY/ IDAHO r a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

)
)
)
}

Respondent

)

------------------------------)
The Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, submits this Reply in
support of his Petition For Judicial Review.

The Petitioner will

address the issues in the same order discussed in the Respondent1s
Response.
A. Fricke Creek

Road

is

a
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length. Therefore, it is prohibited under the Subdivision Ordinance
and an IFC compliant hammerhead turn-around space at its terminus
does not change that.
The Responderit argues that the provision of the Subdivision which prohibits cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long is inapplicable
because the terminus is a turn-around that complies with the
International Fire Code as adopted by Camas County Ordinance 160
("IFC"). This argument is fatally flawed.
First, Ordinance 160 was adopted after the filing of the
Fricke Creek Subdivision application. The Fricke Creek application
was filed on June 2, 2008 (R., p. 47). Ordinance 160 was adopted on
July 28, 2008. The law is well established in Idaho that it is the
law in effect at the time of the filing of an application that
governs. Payette River Property Owner Ass'n v. Valley County, 132
Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999), and Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho
407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). Therefore, Ordinance 160 is not applicable to the

application in question.

Also,

for the

sake of the

record, the Petitioner has not consented to the ordinance becoming
part of the Record.
Second, even if the IFC ordinance was applicable, the
agreement ignores that plain language of Article IV, Section C(7)
prohibiting cul-de-sacs greater than 500 feet in length, and the
specific definition of Cul-de-sac which reads:
(f) Cul-de-sac A street connected to another street
at one end only and provided with a turn-around
space at its terminus.
The approved Subdivision Plat (R., p. 236) shows Fricke
Creek Road

(a)

(Baseline Road)

is connected at one end oniy to another

street

and (b) has a turn-around space provided at its

terminus. Therefore, by definition it is a cul-de-sac street. Also
the Plat established it is greater than 500 feet in length. The
fact that the turn-around has a design referred to as a "hammerhead" in the IFC does has no effect since shape of the terminus
does not change the Subdivision definition of cul-de-sac.
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 2

Hit

. LtW,/ l' 1KI'II

r 1'. A

11 U. L U0

10

JIO

1.

UU"t

Also, the Respondent argues that Fricke Creek Road does
not violate the prohibition against cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long
because it is a .. stub street" under Article IV, Section C (3). This
contention is also misplaced.
First, as a matter of statutory construction, the general
requirement regarding "stub streets" does not supersede the
specific prohibition against cul-de-sacs over 500 feet long.
Second, the purpose of stub streets is to provide access
from streets within a proposed subdivision to adjacent undeveloped
land for future development. Such streets are a dead-end streets
without a turn-around at the end: hence the name "stub streets." On
the other hand, the purpose of cul-de-sac streets is to provide
vehicular and emergency vehicle access to the lots within the
Subdivision: hence the requirement for a turn around at the end.
While a cul-de-sac may provide access to adjoinirig lands that does
not change its specific definition or the prohibition against its
excessive length.
To read the stub street provision as trumping the cul-desac prohibition is to negate that clear prohibition against cul-desac streets over 500 feet in length. The two provisions, when read
together and giving each effect, require "stub streets," if
appropriate, but streets wi th a turn-around at the end are, by
definition, cul-de-sacs and cannot exceed 500 feet in length.
B. Access to a Public Road/Prohibition Against Pr~vate Streets
The Respondent argtleS that Article IV, Section (9), which
prohibits private roads, does not apply to roads outside the
Subdivision because Article IV is entitled "Design Standards."
However, the Subdivision Ordinance is organized so that, regardless
of the location of the improvements, Article IV, t'Design Standards" I contains the general requirements for the design of
improvements, and Article V, n Improvement Standards It, the standards
for the construction of those improvements.
Section (9) of Design Standards prohibits private roads
\..;i th the sole exception of roads "wi thin planned unit developPETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 3
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ments." It does not provide an exception for any other situation.
The Respondent argues that it can only require dedication
of streets within a subdivision and, therefore, the prohibition
against private streets can only apply to such streets. However,
this is a "straw-man" argument because the prohibition against
private roads is not a requirement to force the dedication of land,
rather it is a requirement to ensure public access to the lots
created within a subdivision, unrestricted by limitations in
private easement agreements. This prohibition promotes the legitimate governmental interest of unrestricted public access to the
lots for the protection of the purchasers and residents as well as
the benefit of the general public.
Next, the Respondent argues that Article V, Section B{l),
permits "private roads, easements, etc." to access a Subdivision,
the validity of which is a condition of approval and the responsibility of the property owner to ensure. However, to the contrary,
Section B(l), consistent with Section (9), provides that no
subdivision shall be developed without access to a public street or
road. It is uncontroverted that Fricke Creek Road does not access
to a public street or road, but rather it accesses to the private
easement on the Petitioner's property.
If the requirement is read not to require direct access
to a public street, then any requirement for dedicated public
streets within the subdivision is rendered illusory. This is
because to have public access to the streets within a subdivision
there must be uninterrupted public access from there to another
public street.
Finally, the Respondent's arguments on this issue are not
based upon any specific findings, conclusions or analysis of the
Board's Decision of February 23,2009 (R., p.4) ("Decision") or its
Findings of facts and conclusions of law of March 6,2009 (R., p.l)
( "Findings" ) .

c.

Adjudication o£ Easements is not within the authority. of

the County.
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 4

1 nr, !\ut-',f;1\

LMVY

r

llil'l

On this point we agree. However, by approving the
Subdivision the County has essentially, and improperly, determined
those private rights for the purposes of subdivision: that Fricke
Creek Road across the Jasso Property is a "public road" and not a
prohibited "private road."

D. Flood Plain
To no one's surprise, the Plat (R' T p. 202 and p. 236)
shows Fricke Creek running through the aptly named Fricke Creek
Subdivision. However, the Application does not contain the required
floodplain information or environmental impact statement.
The Respondent argues the flood plain information is not
required because n(t)here is no evidence i:o'the demonstrating that
this subdivision is located in the floodplain, nor could their
(sic) be as an official FEMA map has not yet been adorted." This
agreement fails for several reaSons.
First r the requirement' is not that the information be
provided only for areas shown on an official FEMA map. Rather, i t
is required for the subdivisions within or adjacent to the tlflood
plain" which,

by

definition f

includes the channel,

floodway and

floodway fringe, "as established per the engineering practices as
specified by the Army Corps of Engineers" (emphasis added).
In this case, the location of the channel (part of the
"floodplain" by definition) does not need to be determined because
the applicant has shown it on the Plat. What is not identified are
the boundaries of the floodway and flood fringe areas using the
engineering practices

specified by the Army Corp of. Engineers.

However, that omission does not remove the Application from having
to provide the required flood plain data.
In addition, the Board was advised during the proceedings
'that the County's Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan contains a Camas
County Projected Flood Zone and FEMA Flood Zone Map (R., p. 182)
which includes Fricke Creek. Also, the Idaho Fish and Game letter
advised the Board that Fricke Creek experiences high flows during
spring run off. (R., p. 140).
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 5
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the flood plain issues, it does underscore that there were issues
of fact regarding the flood plain which the Board chose ignore
rather than address

a~ th~y

were required to by Idaho Code 67-6535.

As a result, the Board's Findings, and Decision lack any finding of
fact, conclusion of law or analysis regarding the flood plain.
E. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
The County's Response does provide a valid defense for
the Board's failure to make findings of fact,

conclusions of law

and the analysis required by Idaho Code 67-6535. That statute, in
pertinent part, reads:
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided
for in this chapter shall be in writing and accompanied
by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and
standards considered relevant, states the relevant Contested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for
the decision based on the applicable provisions of the
comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance· and . statutory
provisions,
pertinent constitutional ~rinciples and
factual information contained in the record. (emphasis
added)
The County just makes the assertion that its Findings,
and Decision meet those requirements. It supports this contention
with

the

single

reference

that

it

"specifically addressed the

hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county
specifications and approved by the Road and Bridge Department." It
cites in support of its Findings the decision of Cowan v. Fremont
County,

143 Idaho 501,

148 P.

3d 1247

(2006).

Yet,

the County's

Findings were nothing more than a list of documents in the record
and conclusory statements, which are contrary to the basic rule of
law cited in the Cowan that:
"Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead
what is needed ... is a clear statement of what,
specifically, the decisionmaking body believes,
after hearing and considering all of the evidence,
to be the relevant and important facts upon which
its decision is based"
In the Findings of Fact
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 6
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meager references to the Fricke Creek Road. First, is Finding No.
18, which says the Board remanded the subdivision back to the p&Z
Commission on the reconfiguration of the road, and second is
Finding No. 19, which says the ComIl1ission recommended the new
configuration of the hammerhead. Neither of those "findings" is
anything more than a description of the proceedings. The P&Z
reconunendation dealt only with the hammerhead design being acceptable to the Commission and not anything else about the road (R.,
pgs. 10-11). There is not one specific finding of underlying fact
with regard to Fricke Creek Road, much less any explanation of the
criteria and standards considered relevant or rationale/analysis
in the Board S Findings or Decision. Ironically, the County 's
I

citation to the COltlan decision only underscores that the County did
not meet, as a matter of law, eyen the ~~sic requirements with
regard to its Findings, and Decision.
Compliance with the requirements of Idaho Code 67-6535,
is not some troublesome, technical requirement that can be ignored
by the County. Those are the fundamental requirements of constitutional due process in quasi-judicial proceeding such as this.
Cooper v. Ada County, infra p. 2. These constitutional principles
have been codified by the Idaho Legislature beginning with enactment of the Local Land Use Planning Actin 1975, and proyide the
statutory framework local decision makers must follow in making
quasi-judicial decisions.
Such statutory requirements not only
protect fundamental constitutional rights, but provide a framework
for making proper and reasoned land use decisions.
Besides protecting constitutional rights , it is important
to consider the other legislative purposes behind statutes, such as
Idaho Code 67-6535. The decision of Topanga Association For A
Scenic Community v. County of Las Angles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 522 p.2d
12 (1974), contains a scholarly discussion of the purposes of such
statutory requirements, including:
1. to provide a legal framework for making reasoned
and principled decisions;
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 7
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2. to help make legally relevant conclusions, and
orderly analysis, and reduce the likelihood the
governmental entity will randomly leap from evidence to conclusion;
3. serve to help enhance the integrity of the
process and persuade the parties that the decisionmaking process is careful, reasoned, and equitable;

4. enable the parties to determine whether and on
what basis they should seek judicial review; and,
5. appraise the reviewing court of the basis for
the decision.
In conclusion on this point, since the Board's Findings,
and Decision are totally deficient, the Decision must be vacated.
F. Attorney Fees
On this issue, the Respondent mis-characterizes the
Petitioner's straightforward objections to the Subdivision as "advice" to have the County conunit "an ultra-vires" act: presumaply
requiring dedication of property the developer did not own. The
Respondent then vilifies this "advice" as ~iven to prevent Mr. Dunn
from "exercising his constitutional property right in subdividing
his property." This is truly a disingenuous argument: one without
any basis in fact.
Mr. Jasso never advised the County to require dedicatIon
of that portion of Fricke Creek Road within the private access
easement. Mr. Jasso never claimed the County had the power to do
so. To the contrary, he advised the County that Dunn had the right
to access and develop his property subject to the limitations of
the private easement, one of which is that the road could not be
dedicated or used by the County as a public road (R., pgs. 177 and
205). These facts underscore the groundless and unfair nature of
the County's argument that Mr. Jasso was attempting to force the
County into committing some unlawful act to deprive Mr. Dunn of his
property rights.
What Mr. Jasso actually did throughout the review process
(along with other people) was raise specific objections where the
PETITIONER JASSO'S REPLY - 8
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Subdivision Application did not
Ordinance.
What did the Board do?
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Subdivision

The Board ignored the

issues

raised. The Board ignored the statutorily mandated decision-making
process. The Board approved the Subdivision without making its
Decision in the reasoned manner required by Idaho Code 67-6535. In
doing so, the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner and
deprived Mr. Jasso of fundamental constitutional and statutory
rights. To protect those rights and make the Board comply with the
law, Mr. Jasso had to seek this judicial review and incur attorney
fees in doing so.
Rather than admit its mistakes, the Board is still trying
to justify it's actions with arguments based on matters not found
ln the Findings or Decision. Such arguments cannot be legitimately
advanced in support of, much less to uphold, the Decision.
With each step in its course of conduct, the Board has
made Mr. Jasso incur attorney fees to protect his rights, to have
the County correct its mistakes and violations of law, and to
prevent the County from acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. Since the purpose of I.C. Section 12-117 is (I) to serve as
a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary action, and (2) to provide
a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes agencies should have
never made, Mr. Jasso is entitled to an award of his attorney fees.
DATED this ~day of July, 2009
Respectfully submitted,

by
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that

the~day

of July, 2009, I faxed a copy of
the foregoing document to the following:
Mr. Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, ID 83702
Via Fax: 208-331-1202
attorney for Camas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum ID 83340
Via Fax: 208-622-2755
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

Dated:

l' 2 1-
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JAMES W. PHILLIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208/788-2427

ISB # 1520
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

RECORD

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

)
)

Petitioner,
VS.

Consolidated
Case Nos. CV-2009-14
and CV-2009-15
REQUEST FOR SETTING
ORAL AGRUEMENT

OF

)
)
)

Respondent

)

------------------------------))
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,

)
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

vs.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

)
)
)
)

Respondent

)

-------------------------------)
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named petitioner,
by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark I,avl Firm, his
attorneys of record, and hereby requests this Court to set this
matter for oral agruement at the the Court's chambers in Hailey,
MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLING AND LODGING
OF RECORD WITH COURT - 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t11

I hereby certify that the J.l-day of July I 2009, I fax~d the
foregoing document to the following:
Mr. Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 w. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, ID 83702
Fax No. 208-331-1202
attorney for Camas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum ID 83340
Fax No. 208-622-2755
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

Dated:

J - L"1- tX(

MOTION TO COMPEL SETTLING AND LODGING
OF RECORD WITH COURT - 3

llips
for Petitioner

Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c.

371-A Walnut Avenue North
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 622-6699
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116
benworst@cox.net
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

*****
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

)
)
)

Petitioner,

)

v.

Consolidated Cases:
Case No. CV 2009-14
Case No. CV-2009-15

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

)
)
)

Respondent.

)
)
)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, husband
and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO CAMAS COUNTY'S
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS'
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
IRCP 84(1)

)
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.

)

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 1

COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of
record, and submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Response to Petitioners'
Motion to Augment Record objecting to such Response for the following reasons:
Counsel for Camas County argues that, "Petitioners have consented to the requested
augmentation.... " This is not accurate. Gorringes consent only to "augmentation of the record
with the applicable Zoning Ordinance .... " See Gorringes' Memorandum In Opposition to

Camas County's Motion to Augment Record, p. 2, on file in this action. Gorringes made it clear
that Camas County must demonstrate that the subject International Fire Code Appendix is part of
such applicable Ordinance.
On its face, Camas County Ordinance No. 160, attached to the Affidavit of Dwight Butlin In
Support of Respondent's Motion to Augment Record on file in this action, was passed by the
County Commissioners on July 28, 2008. See ButZin Affidavit, Exhibit A, page 3. Nonetheless,
the subject preliminary plat application was submitted almost two months earlier on June 2,

2008. See Finding No.2, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record Document No.2. In
Idaho, the ordinances and plans in effect at the time of application govern the application, not
ordinances passed subsequent to the application. South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs of
Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882 (1990). Thus, on its face, Camas County
Ordinance No. 160 is not "the applicable Zoning Ordinance".
Accordingly, if Camas County can locate the applicable zoning ordinance, Gorringes will
consent to augmentation of the record with the same. If Camas County can clearly demonstrate
that it incorporated the 2006 International Fire Code Appendix D into such ordinance, Gorringes
will consent to augmentation of the record with that Appendix as well.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION
~-3
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 2

C<

Ju. _
DATED this p a y Of~, 2009 .
. BENiAMIN W. WORST,

p.e.

Benjamm W. Worst,
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.p.

~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of ~
• 2009. I caused a
true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOS ION TO CAMAS COUNTY'S
RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:

);l

( ) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
/
( ) Overnight Mail
00 Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 ~.

Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq.
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

I

Mr. Patrick Dunn
35211 Palmeter Lane SE
Snoqualmie, Washington 98065

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~Facsimile: ( ) ~I

James W. Phillips
The Roark Law Firm
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(>9 Facsimile: (208) 788-3918 t::.1N.I

BENJAMIN W. WORST,

'i 4'

I

p.e.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO AMAS COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' MOTION
TO AUGMENT RECORD - 3
~

Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.

371-A Walnut Avenue North
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 622-6699
Facsimile: (20S) 726-S116
benworst@cox.net
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

*****
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

Consolidated Cases:

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

Case No. CV 2009-14
Case No. CV-2009-15

)

~

PETITIONERS' REBUTTAL
BRIEF
(GORRINGE)

)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

)
)
)

Respondent.

IRCPS4(p)

)
)
)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE, husband
and wife,

)
)
)

Petitioners,

'I

)

)
)

v.

)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
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COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Camie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by
and through Benjamin W. Worst of the law firm Benjamin W. Worst, P.c., their attorney of
record, and submit this Rebuttal Brief in opposition to Camas County's Response Brief.

I.

LABELLING IT A "HAMMERHEAD" DOES NOT EXEM PT THE ROAD FROM
ANALYSIS UNDER THE SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE - IT IS STILL A
PROHIDITED CUL-DE-SAC.
The Court must apply the plain language of Camas County Ordinance No. 152

(the"Subdivision Ordinance") which clearly defines the road depicted on the approved
preliminary plat as a "cul-de-sac". Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory construction is
unnecessary and courts are free to apply the plain meaning of the statute. Martin v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,246,61 P.3d 601,603 (2002). The Subdivision Ordinance
defines a "cul-de-sac" as follows, "(f) Cul-de-sac - A street connected to another street at one end
only and provided with a turn-around space at its terminus." Camas County Ordinance No. 152,
Article III, Section B. The plat map speaks for itself.
The preliminary plat clearly indicates that "Fricke Creek Road" is connected to another
street at one end only. The "hammerhead" is nothing more than a turn-around space at its
terminus. If the Court agrees that the road is a "cul-de-sac", such road "shall not be more than
500 feet in length." Camas County Ordinance No. 152, Article IV, Section C.7. In its current
configuration, Fricke Creek Road is over 3,000 feet in length just within the proposed
subdivision and substantially longer before it connects with another road beyond the Gorringe
and Jasso properties.
Even if the 2006 International Fire Code, Appendix D were applicable in the case at
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hand1, such Fire Code Appendix does not trump the Subdivision Ordinance. Appendix D does
nothing more than provide minimum design standards if, and only if, dead end streets are
allowed. In this instance, the Subdivision Ordinance clearly prohibits dead end streets longer
than 500', so Appendix D has no application.
A glance at the preliminary plat confirms that Fricke Creek Road violates the Subdivision
Ordinance. Nonetheless, Camas County made no effort to reconcile the obvious discrepancy
between the plain language of the Subdivision Ordinance and the configuration of the proposed
road by adopting any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law explaining the County's rationale.
This, in spite of Gorringes' repeated demands in writing and verbally at multiple public hearings
that Camas County correct the obvious oversight. Established case law in Idaho is clear that
mere recitations of evidence and conclusory statements will not satisfy LLUPA's requirement for
a "reasoned statement". See Cowen v. Board of Comm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,
503, 148 P.3d 1247, 1257 (2006) and Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho
72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007).
Camas County claims in its "Response" that it, "specifically addressed the hammerhead
dead-end street .... " County's Response, p. 8. The Conclusion of Law in question reads as
follows: "The subdivision road is to be built to county specifications including culverts, signage
and hammerhead and approved by the Road and Bridge Department." Record Doc. No.3,

emphasis added. Camas County made no finding that the road is not a cul-de-sac let, nor did it
make any attempt to accompany such finding with some rational explanation of how the road,

1 The Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Motion to Augment Record includes as Exhibit A Camas
County Ordinance No. 160 which on its face indicates that it was passed on July 28,2008. The
application in the case at hand was filed on June 2, 2008, almost two months before such ordinance was
passed. In Idaho, the ordinances and plans in effect at the time of application govern, not ordinances
passed subsequent to the application. South Fork Coalition v. Board of Comm'rs of Bonneville County,
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which is so obviously a cul-de-sac, is not as it appears. Camas County never got to the level of
mere recitations and conclusory statements, it ignored the issue completely leaving Gorringes'
assertions and the evidence on the record unrebutted. In failing to make adequate Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of law in the face of clear evidence and repeated arguments to the contrary,
Camas County violated the Gorringes' right to due process.

II.

THE APPROVAL CONVERTS A PRIVATE EASEMENT INTO A PRIVATE STREET
All parties agree that the Subdivision Ordinance prohibits private streets in subdivisions.

Camas County Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B. The preliminary plat approval creates a
public island (the street as it passes through the subdivision) alone in a private sea (the only
access is across the Gorringe and Jasso properties). This public inholding draws the uninvited
public across the private easement thereby inviting the general public to trespass and converting
the easement to a private street. Under the Subdivision Ordinance, a" private street" is a, "street
that is not accepted for public use or maintenance which provides vehicular and pedestrian access
(See page 30 of Camas County, Idaho Street Standards)." Camas County Ordinance No. 153,
Article II, Section B.
Assuming that "Fricke Creek Road" as depicted on the preliminary plat is public 2, as a
practical matter, such public street will draw the general public across the private easements over
the Gorringe and Jasso properties. Without compensating Jasso and the Gorringes for a taking,
the County cannot convert the private easement into a public street, nonetheless the expanded

117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882 (1990).
2 Although the word "public" appears in parentheses after the words "Fricke Creek Road" on the
approved preliminary plat, plat note no. 7 states that "Fricke Creek Loop" will be privately owned and
maintained roads (by Homeowners Association) with public access." See Record, Doc. No. 236.
Presumably this is a mistake, but again, one cannot be certain because Camas County made no finding
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usage caused by the new subdivision creates a de facto private street in violation of the
Subdivision Ordinance. Here again, without comment and leaving testimony to the contrary on
the record unrebutted, the County failed to make any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law to
address this issue, not even a conclusory statement or mere recitation of evidence.

ill.

CAMAS COUNTY HAS APPLICABLE FLOODPLAIN CRITERIA IN THE
SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE, IT JUST CHOSE TO IGNORE THAT CRITERIA.

Camas County is not excused, as it argues, from obtaining mandatory floodplain information
and evaluating that information simply because no FEMA floodplain map has been adopted for
the area. Like the dispute over the road, Camas County need look no further than its own
Subdivision Ordinance to resolve floodplain issues. The relevant portions of the Subdivision
Ordinance state as follows:
SECTION B. MEANING OF TERMS OR WORDS.
•

a.

b.
c.

d.

FLOOD PLAIN: The relatively flat area or low land adjoining the
channel of a river, stream, lake or other body of water which has been
or may be covered by water of a flood of one hundred year frequency.
The flood plain includes the channel, floodway, and floodway fringe,

as established per the engineering practices as specified by the
Army Corps of Engineers as follows:
"Flood of one hundred year frequency" shall mean a flood magnitude
that has a one percent (1 %) chance of being equaled or exceeded in
any given year.
"Flood" shall mean the temporary inundation of land by overflow
from a river, stream, lake or other body of water.
"Channel" shall mean the natural or artificial watercourse of
perceptible extent, with defmite bed and banks to confine and conduct
continuously or periodically flowing water.
"Floodway" shall mean the channel or a watercourse and those
portions of the flood plain adjoining the cahnnel, which are
reasonably required to carry and discharge the flood water of any

which addresses the issue.
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watercourse.
e. "Flood Fringe" shall mean that part of the flood plain that is beyond
the floodway. Such areas will include those portions of the flood
plain which will be inundated by a flood of one hundred year
frequency but which may be developed when such development will
not have a significant effect upon the floodwater carrying capacity of
the floodway and the flood water levels. Shallow flood depths and
low velocities of water flow characterize such areas.
Camas County Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B. (emphasis
added).

This definition does not require the County to formally adopt a FEMA map, rather the
Subdivision Ordinance defines the flood plain in accordance with engineering practices. Again,
Camas County adopted no finding of fact or conclusion of law relevant to the issue in spite of
unrebutted evidence and argument on the record indicating that the property is in the floodplain.
Camas County alleges that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that the
subdivision is located in the floodplain even though the name of the subdivision is "Fricke Creek
Subdivision", the approved preliminary plat includes arrows to demonstrate the flow line and
channel of Fricke Creek (Record Doc. No. 236) and the Staff Report dated July 15, 2008, states
that Fricke Creek crosses the property from north to south and is a "seasonal creek". Staff

Report, Record No. 146. As if this were not enough evidence to trigger some inquiry into the
floodplain issues, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game stated in its letter dated February 1,
2008 that, "Fricke Creek can experience high flows during spring run-off events." Record No.

140, emphasis added.
In his August 13, 2008 letter to the County Commissioners, attorney Christopher Simms

argued on behalf of the Gorringes that the Subdvision is in the floodplain and therefore subject to
floodplain analysis under the Camas County Subdivision Ordinance and Multi-Hazard
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Mitigation Plan. Record Doc. No. 182. Simms went so far as to direct Camas County in writing
to the appropriate map. "The Board of Commissioners adopted the Multi-Hazard Mitigation
Plan, which by its terms is integrated into the Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. The
Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan contains in Section 1.2.4, figure 4.5 on page 59, the floodplain
overlay map." Record Doc. No. 182.
As usual, Camas County ignored all of this evidence, brushed off the Gorringes' concerns
and made no fmdings of fact or conclusions of law which address this issue. The County could
have required some rebuttal evidence that the property is not in the floodplain "per the
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of Engineers" and then made a finding to
that effect, but shrugged it off and in so doing, failed to provide a "reasoned statement" as
required by LLUPA. That Camas County failed to meet its obligation to provide a "reasoned
statement" becomes even more apparent when one considers the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis
in Crown Point. "Additionally, several of the findings consist of nothing more than a recitation
of testimony given in the record. By reciting testimony, a court or agency does not find a fact
unless the testimony is unrebutted in which case the court or agency should so state." Crown
Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573, 577 (2007) (emphasis
added).
In the case at hand the Court is presented with the opposite scenario from that in Crown
Point i.e., Gorringes testified that the property is in the floodplain and that critical floodplain was
required; however, Camas County failed to rebut this testimony. Staff, the neighbors and other
state agencies all presented evidence and argument that the Subdivision is located within the
floodplain; however, Camas County made no finding on the issue leaving the evidence in the
record that the property is located within the floodplain unrebutted in violation of Gorringes'
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right to due process.
IV.

ATTORNEY FEES.

In arguing against an award of attorney fees for its failure to act with a reasonable basis in
fact or law, the County is so bold as to claim it "provided an in depth analysis" of its
Subdivision Ordinance. See County's Response Brief, p. 9, emphasis added. The Gorringes
would have been delighted with an in depth analysis and an honest application of the law.
They might have even accepted a mediocre analysis with a weak application of the law.
However, Gorringes are before this Court now because Camas County completely ignored
the Gorringes, made light of their serious concerns, ignored the law, and did as it pleased
meeting the legal standard for failure to act with a reasonable foundation in fact or law.
"Wholly ignoring the provisions of its own ordinances amounts to a failure to act with a
reasonable basis in fact or law." Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d
1091, 1098 (2005). As a result of Camas County's disregard for their rights, Gorringes have
born an unfair and wholly unjustified financial burden attempting to correct mistakes Camas
County never would have made if it had made even a weak attempt to satisfy the bare
minimum requirements of the law. Now, Gorringes ask the Court to make that right.

"""
DATED this nday of

-Jso/
....~,....--

,2009.

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
Attorney At Law

enjamin W. Worst,
Attorney for Petitioners Gorringe
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) Overnight Mail
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) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
) Hand Delivered
) Overnight Mail
) Facsimile: (208) 788-3918 ~.

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
Attorney At Law
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CV -2009-0000014
Stephen V Jasso vs. Camas County
Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled
Hearing date: 8119/2009
Time: 10:25 am
Judge: Robert J Elgee
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: BOBBIE
Tape Number:
9:22 Case called. Time for oral argument. Two additions to Augment Record.
Attorneys present .Mrs. Helinka, representing Camas County, Jim Phillips, representing
Jasso, Ben Worst, representing Gorringe.
Jim Phillips on his motion to augment. Motion Granted
County withdraws its motion in regards to fire code.
9:26 Ben Worst on Oral argument.
In regards to road/culdesac.
9:25 In regards to the flood plain. Is it in a flood plain?
Mandates of LUPA.
In regards to County's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law.
9:43 In regards to request for attorneys fees.
9:45 Jim Phillips - Oral argument.
Makes correction. Reply brief, page 6.
In regards to commissioners approach to this application and findings of fact.
9:56 Mrs. Helinka, Back ground. County applying & interrupting its own ordinance.
In regards to private road vs public road.
Judge speaks re: Ord. private road vs public, road & utility easement.
Mrs. Helinka gives her view on the ordinance meaning.
Re: Access to a public road.
Judge Elgee re: adjoining property owners private easement.
Mrs. Helinka, County has no specific finding regarding easement.
Judge Elgee questions Mrs. Helinka on some facts on the preliminary plat map.
10:22 Mrs. Helinka In regards to the road/culdesac, State Fire Codes - Hammerhead
design.
10:26 Judge Elgee in regards to road connecting to Princess Mine Rd. If it meets the
definition of a culdesac. Ord. says it can't be over 500 ft long.
10:30 Mrs.Helinka with respect to Fire code, and fire access.
10:32 Mrs.Helinka with respect to the flood plain, map, FEMA.
10:34 Mrs.Helinka with respect to request for attorneys fees, feels premature.
10:36 Mrs.Helinka with respect to findings of fact and conclusions of law.
10:42 Mr.Worst's rebuttal argument. Failure to give his clients due process.
10:46 Mr. Phillip's rebuttal argument. County ignored its own ordinance.
10:49 Judge Elgee will take this under advisement. First issue is that it is a street over 500
ft long. Second issue is the easement/public access. Third issue flood plain.

ORIGINAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Petitioner,

Consolidated Case Nos. CV -2009-14 and
CV-2009-1S

vs.
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO. a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO AUGMENT THE
RECORD

Respondent.
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,
Petitioners.
vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO. a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho
Respondent.
Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, by and through James W. Phillips of The Roark Law
Firm. his attomeys of record, filed a motion to augment the record on June 29(\ 2009.
The motion was made pursuant to IRCP 84( 1) and requested the following
documents be made part of the Agency Record:
1. Preliminary plat initially submitted as pati of the application dated 6-20-08.
2. Minutes of the March 9. 2009 meeting of the Camas County Board of
Commissioners.
Camas County had no objection to the motion.

Based on the review by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record is GRANTED.
Dated this _ _ day of August. 2009.

Robert J. Elgee
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -L1.L day of August, 2009. I caused to be served
a true copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below. and addressed to
each of the following:
James W. Phillips
The Roark La\\! Firm
409 W. Main Street
Hailey. ID 83333
Attorney for Stephen V. Jasso

<U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX

Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, ID 83340
Attorney for Curtis and Camie Gorringe

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Camas County, Idaho

:s:: U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

I-Ia..~d

Deli'./ered

_ Overnight Mail
FAX

Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

STEPHEN V. JASSO,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho

)
)
)

Petitioner,

Consolidated Case Nos. CV-2009-14 and
CV-2009-1S

ORDER UPON HEARING FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

)
______R_e~sp~o_n_d_en_t_.______________ )
)
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
)
husband and wife,
)
)
Petitioners,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the state of Idaho
)
)
)
Respondent.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This order comes on Stephen V. Jasso's and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe's petition
for judicial review. The petitioners have taken issue with the Camas County Board of

Commissioner's February 23, 2009 preliminary plat approval of a fourteen-lot
subdivision. This issue is appealable pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6521 because it is
conceded by Camas County that they have given the applicant in these proceedings
permission to break ground. Deane Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916. I
All parties submitted briefs and the court heard oral argument on August 19,
2009. Camas County has been represented throughout by Moore Smith Buxton &
Turcke, Chtd., Boise. Stephen V. Jasso has been represented throughout by James W.
Phillips of the Roark Law Firm, Hailey. Curtis and Carnie Gorringe have been
represented throughout by Benjamin W. Worst of Benjamin W. Worst, P.C, Ketchum.
Camas County had a Motion to Augment the Record that was withdrawn at the hearing.
In its briefs and at hearing, the petitioners set forth numerous allegations why it
believed the county's approval of the subdivision application was in error. In brief,
petitioners allege that the proposed subdivision includes a cul-de-sac on a road more than
500 feet in length violating Camas County's Subdivision Ordinance; that approval
converted a private access easement into a private road in violation ofthe Subdivision
Ordinance; that the preliminary plat application fails to include significant mandatory
information regarding the floodplain; and that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
1 A person who has "an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial
of a permit authorizing the development" and who is "aggrieved by a decision" granting or denying the
permit may seek judicial review, after exhausting all remedies under the county ordinance. Johnson
quoting I.e. § 67-6521. The approval of an application for a subdivision constitutes a decision granting a
permit. The granting of a permit authorizes the development and is therefore appealable, if it "places a
developer in a position to take immediate steps to permanently alter the land." Johnson quoting Payette
River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Board o/Comm 'rs o/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,555,976 P.2d 477,
481 (1999). An affected person means one "having an interest in real property which may be adversely
affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development." Johnson quoting I.e. § 67252I(1)(a). Jasso and Gorringes have real property which may be adversely affected by the approval of the
Subdivision because their properties are located adjacent or almost adjacent to the proposed Subdivision,
the single access road to the Subdivision is proposed through their property, and the Subdivision will
increase the amount and character of traffic traveling through their property. Jasso and Gorringes are
adversely affected by the decision of the Board in a manner different in kind and degree than the general
public.
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Law justifying the preliminary plat approval are wholly insufficient and fail to constitute
the "reasoned statement" required by Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA)
On April 10, 2007 Patrick Dunn submitted a preliminary plat application to
subdivide an approximately 80 acre parcel of property. (R., p. 83). On July 10,2007,
Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") held a public hearing
on the application, and on August 7, 2007 and September 4,2007, the Commission
discussed the matter at its regular meetings. Dunn submitted a second preliminary plat
application (the "Application") for the same subdivision on June 2, 2008 after Camas
County adopted a new zoning ordinance (Camas County Comprehensive Plan and
Zoning Ordinance). (R., p. 47). The application was for fifteen, six-acre lots. Fricke
Creek runs through the property, and the Subdivision is accessed by a single street
approximately 1 mile in length. A substantial portion of the mile long street is located
within the private access easement from the Dunn property across the Jasso property and
the Gorringe property to Baseline Road, a public street. (R., p. 236). At build out, the
Subdivision will generate 150 vehicle trips per day. (R., p. 145).
The Commission held a public hearing on the application on August 18, 2008, which
the Petitioners attended. (R., p. 17, and R., p. 177). Petitioners objected to the
application at the meeting and sent a letter to the Commission urging them not to approve
the application for the same reasons set forth in their briefs and at hearing, listed above.
CR., p. 209). On September 2, 2008, the Commission unanimously voted not to approve
the application and made its recommendation to the Board of Camas County
Commissioners ("Board"). (R., p.16). The recommendation, dated September 4, 2008,
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was to deny the application due to "the quality of the easement and the road layout as per
the subdivision ordinance and the possibility that it is a cul-de-sac." (R., p. 16).
On September 22, 2008, the Board first considered the application. (R., p. 237).
The Board did not hold a public hearing or take public comment with regard to the
application. On January 12,2009, the Board entered its decision to have a hammerhead
tum-around at the terminus of Fricke Creek Road. (R., p. 13). The Board also instructed
the Commission to hold a public hearing for the purpose of reviewing the design of the
hammerhead tum-around. (R., p. 242).
On February 3, 2009, the Commission held a public hearing and recommended
approval of the proposed design of the hammerhead. (R., pgs. 8, 10, and 11). Jasso and
Gorringe appeared, via their attorneys, objecting to the Application for the same reasons
previously stated. (R., p. 11). On February 23, 2009, the Board made its decision
approving the application, and on March 6, 2009, the Board re-executed its decision
form. (R., p. 4 and 5). On March 9, 2009, the Chairman of the Board signed the
"Findings of facts and conclusions oflaw." (R., p. 1-3).
Petitioners Jasso and Gorringe timely filed their Petitions for Judicial Review.
The actions were consolidated and issues of law were bifurcated from issues of fact by
Court Order dated May 4,2009.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of local
land use decisions. Price v. Payette County Bd O/County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426,
429,958 P.3d 583, 586 (1998). The Idaho Supreme Court, in Evans v. Teton County, 139
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Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003), has clearly set forth the standard of review for judicial
review of the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A) as follows:
The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected
person to seek judicial review of an approval or denial of a land use
application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act
(IDAP A). Idaho Code § 67-6521 (1)( d) (2002); Evans v. Bd of Comm 'rs
of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 430, 50 P.2d 443, 445 (2002). The
district court conducts judicial review of the actions of local government
agencies. I.R.C.P. 84(a)(1) (2002). For purposes of judicial review of
LLUPA decision, a local agency making a land use decision, such as the
Board of Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under
IDAPA. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742
(2000). [Camas County (acting through the Planning and Zoning Board
and the Board of Adjustment) is treated as an administrative agency for
purpose of judicial review. Stevenson v. Blaine Co., 134 Idaho 756, 759, 9
P.3d 1222, 1225 (2000).] The district court bases its judicial review on the
record created before the local government agency. I.R.C.P. 84(e)(1).
This Court reviews decisions under the IDAPA independently of any
intermediate appellate court. Evans, 137 Idaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446.
The Court must affirm the Board of Commissioners unless it
determines the Board of Commissioners' findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (1) violated the constitution or statutory
provisions; (2) exceeded its statutory authority; (3) were made upon
unlawful procedure; (4) were not supported by substantial evidence on the
record; or (5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Id.;
I.C. § 67-5279(3). There is a strong presumption that the actions of the
Board of Commissioners, where it has interpreted and applied its own
zoning ordinances, are valid. Evans, 137 Idaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446;
[Cowan v. Bd 0fComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148
P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006)].
The party appealing the Board of
Commissioners' decision must first show the Board of Commissioners
erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279(3), and second, that a
substantial right has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4); Price v. Payette
County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998);
[Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 1254].
Whether the Board of Commissioners violated a statutory
provision is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d
9, 13 (2002); Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247, 252
(2000).
This Court defers to the Board of Commissioners' findings of fact
unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. [I.C. § 67-5279(1 )];
Evans, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446; Friends' of Farm to A1arket, 137
Idaho at 196, 46 P .3d at 13. The Board of Commissioners' factual findings
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are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported by substantial.
competent. although conflicting evidence. Friends of Farm to Market,
137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13.

Id. at 74-75, 75 P.3d at 87-88.
Agency action is "capricious if it is done without a rational basis" and "arbitrary if
it was done in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate
determining principles." American Lung Ass 'n, etc. v. State ofDep 't ofAgriculture, 142
Idaho 544,547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006). If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall
be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. I.e.
§ 67-5279(3).

ISSUES
Petitioners Jasso and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe raise identical issues:
1. Whether the proposed access road in the Subdivision constitutes a cul-de-sac
street more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article IV, Section C.7 of the
Subdivision Ordinance;
2. Whether approval of the Subdivision creates an access road across the Jasso and
Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of the Subdivision
Ordinance or whether Camas County violated Article V, Section B.l of its own
Subdivision ordinance by granting the developer approval to commence
development of the property without access to a public street or road;
3. Whether Mr. Dunn's application contained required information relating to flood
plains;
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4. Whether the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the
requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(b);
5. Whether petitioners have suffered actual harm or violation of fundamental rights,
not the mere possibility thereof, as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(c); and
6. Whether the County's approval of the preliminary plat application was without a
reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of attorney fees to Jasso and
Gorringe under Idaho Code § 12-117(1).

ANALYSIS

A. Does the proposed access road in the Subdivision constitutes a cul-de-sac street
more than 500 feet in length in violation of Article IV, Section C.7 of the Subdivision
Ordinance?

Camas County Subdivision Ordinance 152, Article IV, Section C(7) states, "Culde-sac streets shall not be more than five hundred (500) feet in length and shall terminate
with an adequate tum-around having a minimum radius of seventy-five (75) feet for right
of way." Section B of the Subdivision Ordinance, in pertinent part, states that a cul-desac is "a street connected to another street at one end only and provided with a turnaround space at its terminus." This ordinance is not ambiguous and the applicant's
proposed street meets this definition, and is therefore required to be not more than 500
feet.
Camas County conceded at oral argument that the proposed road is approximately
3,000 feet long. In its brief, Camas County asserts that while it is true that a cul-de-sac
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cannot exceed five hundred feet, there are several other available dead-end access roads
used in the County pursuant to the International Fire Code adopted by the County via
Ordinance 160. The county further states that Article IV, Section C(3) specifically
provides for Stub Streets where it is anticipated that future connectivity may be a viable
option. The County asserts that under Camas County Ordinance 160, the County adopted
Appendix D of the 2006 edition of the International Fire Code, which provides for an
access road in the form of a Hammerhead design to be utilized in lieu of other dead-end
streets including, a cul-de-sac road. Therefore, the County alleges the Petitioners'
assertion is irrelevant because the street in dispute is an access road with a hammerhead
and not a cul-de-sac at all.
The International Fire Code was adopted under Ordinance 160, which was
adopted after the filing of the Fricke Creek Subdivision application. It is well established
that an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinance in existence at the time of filing
of the application. Payette River Property Owner Ass 'n v. Valley County, 132 Idaho 551,
976 P.2d 477 (1999). The Fricke Creek application was filed on June 02, 2008, and
Ordinance 160 was adopted on July 28, 2008. (R., p.47). Even if the Fire Code was
applicable, it would not trump the Subdivision Ordinance. Appendix D of the Fire Code
provides minimum design standard for cases where dead end streets are allowed. The
Subdivision Ordinance clearly prohibits streets that are connected to another street at one
end only, i.e., dead end streets.
The particular configuration of the turnaround is of no relevance. The ordinance
only specifies a minimum turning radius. As long as the applicant's terminus meets the
minimum turning radius definition, the nature of the terminus is irrelevant. However, the
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length restriction of the road means the county has violated its own statute by authorizing
a road 6 times its maximum ordinance length.
Moreover, the County made absolutely no findings or conclusions as to the length
of the proposed road, or why it was acceptable. "Conclusion of Law" #6 states, "The
subdivision is in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan, Zoning and Subdivision
ordinances." (R., p. 2). This statement is in error on this point. The subdivision violates
the county's provision regarding cul-de-sac street length. Idaho case law is clear that
mere recitations of evidence and conclusory statements will not satisfy LLUPA's
requirement for a "reasoned statement." Cowan v. Board ofComm 'rs ofFremont
County, 143 Idaho 501, 503,148 P.3d 1247,1257 (2006); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City
ofSun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 76, 156 P.3d 573,577 (2007).

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(a)-(e), the decision approving the
application violates the County's own ordinance. As such, it is in excess of statutory
authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and prejudiced substantial rights of the Petitioners.

B. Did approval of the subdivision create an access road across the Jasso and
Gorringe properties in violation of Article IV, Section C.9 of the Subdivision
Ordinance, and did Camas County violate Article V, Section B.t of its own
Subdivision Ordinance by granting the developer approval to commence
development of the property without access to a public street or road?
(l) The status of the easement.

The Subdivision Ordinance, Article IV, Section C(9) states, "Private streets and
roads shall be prohibited except within planned unit developments." Camas County
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Ordinance No. 153, Article II, Section B defines private as a "street that is not accepted
for public use or maintenance which provides vehicular and pedestrian access." This
ordinance may be ambiguous as applied because it is unclear whether it means no private
roads in subdivisions, or no private roads anywhere. For purposes of this discussion, the
court will assume it means no private roads only in the subdivision. The issue, then, is
that the only road leading from the subdivision to the next public access, which in this
case is Baseline Road, is over (through) Jasso's and Gorringes' easement.
The County agreed at oral argument that the Jasso/Gorringe easement is a private
easement, but the County argues that Article V, Section (B)(1) permits "private roads,
easements, etc." to access a Subdivision, the validity of which is a condition of final
approval and the responsibility of the eventual property owner to ensure. According to
Camas County, either the parties can obtain a declaratory judgment to determine their
relative rights in and over the easement, or the county can look at the status of the
easement, and whether the developer has obtained public access to a public road, at the
time the building permits are sought, presumably by people who have acquired land in
the subdivision and are ready to build.
Article V, Section (B)(1) provides, "No platted subdivision of five (5) or more
lots ... shall be developed without access to a public street or road." The plain language of
the ordinance is clear and unambiguous on this point. According to the County,
"development" of the subdivision would not occur until the proposed residents of the
subdivision apply for building permits. This court rejects that argument and concludes
that the county cannot make compliance with that section conditional and require
compliance at some future time. Instead, the court concludes that the county must insure
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compliance with the Subdivision Ordinance before the developer is ever given
permission to break ground-a fact the County concedes has already occured.
Jasso and Gorringes want the court to rule that the County has, at least impliedly,
determined that the easement is "public" (or can be appropriated for an increase in use by
the subdivision developer) because the County approved the development. They argue
that the County has no authority to simply grant the developer, and therefore subdivision
residents, increased access through their property. They submit that any such approval
would greatly expand the scope of use of their private easement and/or would constitute a
"taking" or appropriation of their private easement for a public purpose. 2 They further
suggest that this process would allow a private street in violation of the County
Subdivision Ordinance.
Camas County submits they have done no such thing. Instead, they argue that
they have made no decision as to whether the developer has or does not have "access to a
public street or road" and the County can therefore await subsequent developments to see
if the developer is able to tum the easement into public access, and improve the road to
meet County standards. The County argues they can review the status of the easement,
and whether it constitutes "public access", at the time residents seek building permits.
This court concludes that the County's own ordinance requires that Article V, Section
(B)(l) requires the County to find and conclude, before the developer is given permission
to break ground, based on evidence in the record, that the proposed subdivision has or
does not have access to a public street or road.

The court recognizes this issue is real. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of
litigation over the question whether increased use of an easement unreasonably increases the burden on the
servient estate. Christensen v. City a/Pocatello, 142 Idaho 132, 135, 124 P.3d 1008, 1011.
2

II

The court concludes that the issue of whether the County has appropriated
petitioner's easement, or whether the approval of this subdivision improperly increases
the burden on petitioner's estates, or constitutes a taking, is not before the court. For
reasons which appear below, those issues are not proper for the court to determine in this
judicial review proceeding.

(2) Findings and Conclusions Regarding the Easement
Petitioners appeared at the public hearings held regarding the application and
submitted letters to the County objecting to the application. The County Planning and
Zoning Committee recommended disapproval of the application. On the
Recommendation Form, dated September 4,2008, the chairman urged the Board to "pay
attention to the quality of the easement and the road layout as per the subdivision
ordinance and the possibility that it is a cul-de-sac." (R., p. 16). Finding of Fact No. 17,
which states, "The Planning and Zoning Commission made a recommendation of
approval to the Board of Commissioners," is plain error. (R., p. 2).
The Board was aware of the easement issue and failed to make any conclusions
regarding the matter. Instead, Conclusion of Law No.5 states, "A copy of the warranty
deed and easement agreement are in the file." (R., p. 2) This is a statement of fact, or a
finding of fact, not a conclusion of law. Either way, it is woefully inadequate as either a
finding of fact or a conclusion of law to resolve what was necessary to resolve in this
case-whether the development currently has or does not have access to a public street
or road.
A finding of fact is a determination of a fact by the court or agency, which fact is
averred by one party and denied by the other and this determination must be founded on
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the evidence in the case. CrOlvn Point Development, Inc, v. City

(~fSun

Valley, 144 Idaho

72,77, 156 P.3d 573,578. The County must reach a conclusion, on a contested record,
of whether there is currently access to a public street or road. It is not sufficient if the
County avoids an issue which has been squarely raised. Only if the Board has reached a
conclusion one way or the other could the court look to see if the evidence in the record is
sufficient to support their conclusion. As it stands now, there are not sufficient findings
or conclusions as to whether there was sufficient access to the subdivision.

C. Did Mr. Dunn's application fail to include required information relating to flood
plains?
Mr. Dunn failed to provide information regarding the flood plain with his
application. Supplying such information allows citizens to make informed arguments and
objections when a public hearing is held on the proposed land use; citizens should not be
forced to attend a public hearing to find out what a developer proposes to do. Johnson v.

City o/Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 287; 796 P.2d 162,164 (1990). Article VI, Section G
of the Subdivision Ordinance states:
For any proposed subdivision that is located within a flood plain, the
developer shall provide the Commission with a development plan of
adequate scale and supporting documentation that will show and explain at
least the following:
(a) Location of all planned improvements.
(b) The location of the floodway and the floodway fringe per
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of
Engineers.
(c) The location of the present water channel.
(d) Any planned rerouting of waterways.
(e) All major drainage ways.
(f) Areas of frequent flooding.
(g) Means of flood proofing buildings.

;)16
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(h) Means of insuring loans for improvements within the flood
plain.
Article VI, Section H(2) states, "The developer shall prepare and submit an
environmental impact statement along with the preliminary plat application for any
development that is proposed within an area of critical concern." An area of critical
concern is designated by the Board or by the State, and under Article VI, Section H(1),
"special concern shall be given to any proposed development within an area of critical
concern to assure that the development is necessary an desirable and in the public interest
in view of the existing unique conditions." Flood plains are included under H( 1) as a
hazardous or unique area that may be designated an area of critical concern.
There is clear evidence that Fricke Creek flows through the subdivision, (R., p.
202 and p. 236), and in a February 1,2008 letter addressed to Camas County Planning
and Zoning, Idaho Department of Fish and Game stated that Fricke Creek can experience
high flows during spring run-off events. (R., p. 140) Additionally, the issue was raised
repeatedly by Petitioners via letters and objection in-person at hearings. There is no
evidence that the subdivision is or is not actually in a flood plain, but it is clear the issue
was raised before the agency, and it is an issue the County should have resolved one way
or another.
The Subdivision Ordinance requires that "for any proposed subdivision that is
located within a flood plain, the developer shall provide the Commission with a
development plan ... " that will show and explain the location of the floodway, etc per
engineering practices as specified by the Army Corps of Engineers. The County contends
because FEMA has not officially adopted a floodplain map for the area, the County
cannot subject an applicant to the flood plain requirements. First, whether FEMA acts or

14

fails to act will not excuse the County from its self imposed duties. Second, whether
FEMA has acted or failed to act is argument of counsel, not a finding that can be made
upon any record. In order to excuse compliance with its own Subdivision Ordinance, the
County would be required to find, based on adequate evidence, that the proposed
development is or is not in a floodplain. If it is, the application process has certain
requirements that must be met. If it is not in a floodplain the application requirements
may be avoided. If the County does not know, that is another matter. In any event, the
issue was raised at hearing by the petitioners, among others, and the County must make
adequate findings and conclusions in this regard. Even if the applicant failed to provide
this information with his application, the County failed to address it. The record is devoid
of any findings or conclusions with regard to a floodplain.

D. Do the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the
requirement for a "reasoned statement" as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(b)?
Under I.e. § 67-6535(b), approval or denial of a land use application must be in
writing and "accompanied by a reasoned statement" explaining the relevant criteria and
standards, the relevant contested facts relied upon, and the rationale for the decision
based on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and relevant ordinances."
The Board's decision must be based on "standards and criteria" set forth in the
"comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation" of
the county. I.C. § 67-6535(a).
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed the adequacy of findings of fact and
conclusions of law for purposes of judicial review. Crown Point Development. Inc. v.
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City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 156 P.3d 573 (2007). While the court in its decision
was addressing the provisions of I.e. § 67-5248(1 )(a), the reasoning has similar
application to § 67-6535. When the Board made its decision to approve the subdivision
application, its decision must be based on "standards and criteria" set forth in the
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation" of
the county; further, the approval or denial of the rezone change must be in writing and
"accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered
relevant, states the relevant contested facts, and explains the rationale for the decision .... "

I.e. § 67-6535 (a)&(b).
In Cowan v. Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247, the court observed
that, "For 'effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning boards, there
must be ... adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.' Workman Family P 'ship v.

City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36, 655 P.2d 926, 930 (1982). Conclusory statements
are not sufficient; instead '[w]hat is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear
statement of what, specifically, the decision making body believes, after hearing and
considering all of the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its
decision is based. '" ld at 37,655 P.2d at 931 (quoting S ofSunnyside Neighborhood

League v. Bd OfComm 'rs, 280 Or. 3,21-22,569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)).
The Camas County Board repeatedly failed to include reasoned statements of
findings of facts and conclusions. As demonstrated in Section A, B, and C, the issues
regarding the cul-de-sac, easement, and flood plain were all raised several times. In
failing to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law in the face of clear
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evidence and repeated arguments to the contrary, Camas County violated Jasso's and
Gorringes' fundamental rights.

E. Have petitioners have suffered actual harm or violation of fundamental rights,
not the mere possibility thereof, as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535(c)?
The petitioner has the burden of establishing that a substantial right is involved
and that he has been prejudiced. Approving a subdivision which violates the Subdivision
Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious and a violation of the Petitioners' constitutional due
process rights. Constitutional due process requirements apply to quasi-judicial
proceedings, such as the approval of subdivision applications. Procedural due process
requires notice of the proceedings, specific written findings of fact, and an opportunity to
be present and rebut evidence. Cooper v. Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947
(1980); I.C. § 67-6535. Due process requires that a decision not be arbitrary or
capricious and not in violation of applicable ordinances. Substantial rights of the
Petitioner have been prejudiced by the Board's action of approving the Subdivision
which violates its own ordinance. Rural Kootenai Org. v. Kootenai County, 133 Idaho
833, 992 P.2d 596 (1999); Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Valley County, 132
Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). Where a decision violates such substantial rights of the
Petitioner it must be vacated. Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P .3d
488 (2002).
The Camas County Board approved the subdivision application despite the
application's clear violations of the Subdivision Ordinance. In addition, the Board failed
to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jasso and Gorringe have
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established their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the Board's decision to
approve the application.

F. Was the County's approval of the preliminary plat application without a
reasonable basis in law or fact sufficient for an award of attorney fees to Jasso and
Gorringe under Idaho Code § 12-117(1)?
All parties seek attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117(1) which provides: "[I]n
any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency
[or] a ... county, ... the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees,
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
The purpose of section 12-117 is to serve as a "deterrent to groundless or arhitrary
agency action" and to "provide a remedy for persons who have been born unfair or
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to
correct mistakes agencies should have never made." Bogner v. State Dep 't. of Rev. and
Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984). Because of Camas County's
failure to follow its own ordinance and its arbitrary and capricious behavior, Stephen
Jasso and Curtis and Carnie Gorringe have born unfair financial burdens.
In Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005),
the Court found that the City of Ketchum wholly ignored the provision of its avalanche
zone district ordinance requiring the certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 'prior to
the granting of a conditional use permit. '" The Court determined that such disregard for
its own ordinance amounted to failure to act with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Here,

(j1~
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Camas County Board of Commissioners acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law
when it ignored the provisions of its Subdivision Ordinance.
Camas County decision to approve the subdivision application was not made in
the reasoned manner required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. The Board acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and deprived Jasso and Gorringes of their fundamental constitutional and
statutory rights. Jasso and Gorringes have had to incur attorney fees to seek judicial
review in order to enforce the Board to comply with the law.
In as much as this court has determined that the action of the Board violated the
due process rights of the petitioner, there was not competent and substantial evidence to
support the decision of the Board, and the decision of the Board was arbitrary and
capricious, the petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs attributable
to the petition for judicial review only. Therefore, such attorney fees and cost shall be
awarded to the petitioners pursuant to I.C. § 12-117.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The decision of the Board of Commissioners of Camas County to approve the
Frick Creek Subdivision is HEREBY VACATED, and the matter is remanded to the
Board of Commissioners for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this {J fday of October, 2009.

RObert~£r

District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of October, 2009, I caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing ORDER UPON HEARING FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW,
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
James W. Phillips
The Roark Law Firm
409 W. Main Street
Hailey, ID 83333
Attorney for Stephen V. Jasso
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, ID 83340
Attorney for Curtis and Camie Gorringe
Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Camas County, Idaho

xU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
_ Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX

:£ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ Overnight Mail
FAX

bOMi b\oQGar:=

Deputy Clerk
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JAMES W. PHILLIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208/788-2427
ISB # 1520

Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,' IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN V. JASSO!

Petitioner,
vs.

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Consolidated
Case Nos. CV-2009-14
and CV-2009-1S
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
AND ATTORNEY FEES

)
)
)

Respondent
)
------------------------------)
)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,

Petitioners,

)

)

r'
)

)
)
)

vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho

Respondent

)
}

)

-----------------------------)
The Petitioner, Stephen V. Jasso, by and through its
attorney of record, James W. Phillips of The Roark Law Firm,
hereby submits this Memorandum of Costs, Disbursements and
Attorney Fees pursuant to IRCP 54 (d) and (e), Idaho Code Section
12-117, and other applicable rules and statutes.

COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

Petition filing fee: 3/20/09

Record copy fees:

check # 7540
Camas County
Court Clerk

$

88.00

3/20/09

check # 7541
Camas County

120.00

4/23/09

check #7562
Camas County

20.00

Total

$ 228.00

ATTORNEY'S FEES

The petitioner respectfully requests attorney fees in the
following amount, and submits that said- attorney fees are
reasonable and based upon the time, labor and hourly rate set for
in the Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees filed herewith, summarized as follows:
ATTORNEY

James W. Phillips

HOURS

BILLING RATE
$ 235.00

88.5

TOTAL
$ 20,797.50

The Petitioner is entitled to an award of said attorney fees
pursuant Idaho Code Section 12-117 because the Petitioner is the
prevailing party and the Respondent acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law.
·
Respect f u 11 y su b m~tted
t h'1S D.~~
~ day of Octo b er 2009
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP

by

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I hereby certify that the ~
day of October, 2009, I mailed the
foregoing document by USPS, first class mail postage prepaid, to
the following:

Mr. Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, ID 83702
attorney for Camas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum ID 83340
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3
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W. PHILLIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208/788-2427
ISB # 1520
Attorneys for petitioner
J_~ES

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND POR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

)
)

Petitioner,

)
)

vs.

Consolidated
Case Nos. CV-2009-14
and CV-2009-15

)
)

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
AND ATTORNEY FEES

)
)
)
)
)

Respondent

)

-------------------------------))
CURTIS AND CAMIE GOR~IN:GE I
... )
husband and w i f e , )
)

Peti tioners ,

)
)

vs.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,

)
)
)
)

Respondent

)

------------------------------)
STATE OF IDAHO

)
}

County of Blaine

55.

)

JAMES W. PHILLIPS, being sworn upon oath, deposes and

AFFIDAVIT - 1

;. UUJ

states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the Petitioer in the above

entitled action, and
Firm.

I

I

am an "of counsel" member of the Roark Law

am duly admitted to the practice of law in the state of

Idaho.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the matters herein

referred to and make this Affidavit in support of Petitioner
Jasso's

Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees in the above

entitled action.

I am competent to testify to the facts set

forth herein if called upon to do so.
3.

The Petitioner is billed and pays the affiant at

the affiant's customeary billing rate rate for legal services of
two hundred thirty-five dollars ($235.00) per hour which

lS

comparable to the prevailing charges for similar work by
attorneys of similar experience in this area.
4.

To establish the outstanding amount due and owing

from a client, the affiant prepares daily time records,
describing the particular legal services performed, together with
the particular date such legal services were rendered, as well as
designating the amount of time spent on the particular matter.
The time slips are

totaled, then multiplied by my hourly rate to

arrive at a bill for legal services performed.

Also added is the

sum of any and all costs advanced through that particular date on
behalf of the client.

The bills are sent to the client on a

monthly basis.
5.

I have performed the legal services for the

Petitioner in connection with the above referenced matter
AFFIDAVIT -

2
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!'iV. LUU

IUU

-J01U

...

UU"!

described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto, and the petitioner has
incurred the sum of $ 20,797.50 for attorneys fees herein and
$228.00 for costs. That sum is reasonable given the nature of the
action, the experience of the affiant, and the legal services
rendered.
6.

I attest to my belief that the items of costs,

disbursements, and attorney fees are correct and were necessarily
incurred and reasonable for the services rendered in prosecution
of this action, and are allowable under IRCP Rule 54(d) and (e),
Idaho Code Section 12-117, and other applicable rules and
statutes.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

q~

day of October, 2009

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
October, 2009.

q -f.jq . day' ~f'

~~\
k.a.J,n}O,A cJ.-o
T~LIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at -b±CL(..I..~
Commission expires
I-VZ-tl

AFFIDAVIT - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the ~~ day of October, 2009, I mailed the
foregoing document by USPS, first class postage prepaid, to the
following:
Mr. Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, ID 83702
attorney for ·Cruuas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum ID 83340
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

Dated:

If) -- q . . ~1

AFFIDAVIT -
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-EXHIBIT "A"

0AMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
P.O. Box 864
Hailey, Idaho 83333

Mr. Steven Jasso
20 Quigley Gulch Rd
Hailey, ID 83333

April 1, 2009

Statement of Account

Re: Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek Subdivision
Services
3/05/09

3/09/09
3/10/09

travel to Fairfield and review Camas
County ordinances, resolutions, affidavits
of publication, and records re: Fricke
Creek and subdivision ordinance adoption
and amendment.s

3.5

legal research re: appeal issues and
requirements for adequate record

1.6

legal research re: appeal issues/standing;
draft outline of petition

2.0

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-'"'3!J/._l'-1.....LL..Ql.L-.I.9_--'w""o~r:..L>k____'_LoD_d;ca f t 0 -F Pe±.i.t.ion Eo r ,Ill d j cia J
Review and legal research re: appeal
issues

3/12/09
3115/09

3/17/09

Hours

4.3

work on draft of Petition For Judicial
Review; meeting with client

1.4

work on draft of Petition For Judicial
Review and legal research re: appeal
issues

2,7

edit draft of Petition For Judicial Review
t. conf. Ben Worst to learn of County's
after-the-fact findings

•7

'.. ' ,,_, 1 /

!, __I

Ji L U

U,)I 1 1'. 1

U

~I •

"t \.,.:

1

m.

3/18/09
3/19/09
3/20/09

3/23/09

1:LVnUU

t...nn

1 1 UI'I

•. vv

review after-the-fact findings and the
issues raised thereby

2.6

revise draft of Petition for Judical
Review and legal research re: issues

2.4

finalize Petition: t. conf. Rollie
Bennett, Camas County Clerk; meeting
with Mr Jasso; t. conf. Worst; travel
to Fairfield to file Petition

2.2

t. conf. Patrick Dunn re: Petition

.1

Total Time:

23.5

Legal Services
Previous Balance
Payments Received

$

Amount Due

$

5,522.50
0·0.00
( 00.00)
5,522.50

I

THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.

409 N. MAIN ST.
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333

Mr. Steve Jasso
20 Quigley Gulch Rd
Hailey, ID 83333

May 1, 2009

Statement of Account

Re; Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek subdivision
~

4/02/09

4/03/09

4/09/09

4/13/09

4/14/08

4/15/09

Services

Hours

review Gorringes' General Statement of
Issues; review Camas County Comprehensive
P'4,gJ1 i;!.11g, n9t~S. oJ m~~tings and hearings
re: Fricke Creek re: Gorringe/Jasso
issues

2.1

draft Motion to Consolidate Petitions For
Judicial Review, Motion To Compel Filing
of Record, and Motion to Bifurcate Legal
Issues

1.0

finalize Motion to Consolidate Petitions,
Motion to Compel Filing of Record; and
Motion to Bifurcate; letters to Judge Elgee,
Fitzer, and Bennett

.8

t. conf. Ben Worst, attorney for Gorringes,

re: motions and appeal issues

.3

t. cont. Fitzer re: motions; t. conf.
Bennett re: record

.2

t. cont. Worst re: motions and appeal
record

.3

li1"
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4/17/09

review Record provided by County

4/20/09

prepare for and attend hearing on County's
Motion To Stay Proceedings, and on
Motion to Consolidate and Motion To
Bifurcate Legal Issues

.9

4/21/09

draft of proposed Order on Motions

.4

4/22/09

draft of Objections to Record; t. cont.
Ben Worst re: problems with record and
objections thereto

1.4

finalize Objections to Record; t. conf.
Ben Worst re: objections; letters to
Judge Elgee, Fitzer, and Bennett

.8

4/23/09

UUJ

2.7

Total Time:

10.9

Legal Services
Reimbursements
filing fee
Record/Transcript
Record Fee .
Previous Balance
payments Received

$

Amount Due

$

2,561.50
88.00
120.00
20.00
5,522.50
(00.00)
8,311.00

:, I) j

THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
409 N. MAIN ST.
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333

Mr. Steve Jasso
20 Quigley Gulch Rd
Hailey, ID 83333
June 1 f 2009
Statement of Account
Re: Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek Subdivision
services

Hours

5/05/09

t. conf. Worst re: Record issues

5/12/09

t. conf. Bennett re: status of record;
review Dunn e-mailj t. conf. worst;
review IRCP and court orders re: schedule;
draft Motion To Compel .Settling_auct Lpdging Of Record

1.7

t. conf. worst, and finalize Motion to
Compel Settling and Lodging Of Record With
Court

.8

5/18/09

5/20/09
review County's Response to Motion to Compel
__________________________~alld t. coni. Worst

.2

.3

5/21/09

draft Reply to County's Response

1.8

5/27/09

review
Motion
Reply;
Martin

1.1

5/28/09

Exhibits to County's Response to
to Compel; revise Petitioner's
t. conf. Worst; read decision in
v. Camas County

edit Petitioner's Reply to County's Response
Total Time:

.4
6.3

.l:lVIIJ,U,:a.

J....ilill
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"V, L. U U
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Legal Services
Previous Balance
Payments Received

$

Amount

$

D~e

1,480.50
8,311.00

(00.00)
9,791.50
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THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
409 N. MAIN ST.
ffAlLEY, IDAHO 83333

Mr. Steve Jasso
20 Quigley Gulcb Rd
Hailey, ID 83333
July 1, 2009
Statement of Account
Re: Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek Subdivision
Servjces

HOUTS

attend hearing on Motion To Compel Settling And Lodging Record

1.0

6/12/09

work on outline of Opening Brief

1.3

6/13/09

review Rebord and

6/14/09

work on draft of Brief

4.5

6/15/09

work on draft of Brief; t. conf. Worst

2.4

6/16/09

t. conf. Worst; work on draft of Brief;
legal research

3.3

6/17/09

work on draft of Brief; legal researcb

2.7

6/20/09

work on draft of Brief; legal research

3.2

6/22/09

work on draft of Brief

1.7

6/23/09

legal research; edit draft Brief

2.2

6/24/09

t. conf. Worst; revisions to Brief

6/29/09

final revisions/edits to Brief; draft
Motion to Augment

6/08/09

le~al.research

re: Brief

Total Time:

2.2

.9
2.3

27.7

nvrUH~

J...nrY

1 11;1'1

j'l1.A

j~V.

LUU

IOU

JJ10

C

U1J

Legal Services
Previous Balance
Payments Received

$

6,509.50

Amount Due

$ 16,301.00

9,791.50

(00.00)
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THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
409 N. MAIN ST.
HAILEY, IDAHO 83333

Mr. Steve Jasso
20 Quigley Gulch Rd
Hailey, ID 83333
Au gu s t

1,

2 009

Statement of Account
Re: Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek Subdivision
Hours

Services
review Respondent's Motion To Augment
and draft Memo in Opposition, letter to
Jill Holinka re: IFC Stipulation; letters
to Bennett, Holinka, and Elgee; draft
of Stipulation To Augment

1.3

7/22/09

'review Resporident "s Response Brief I and'
Brief re: IFC; begin work on Reply Brief

1.7

7/23/09

work on Reply Brief

2.3

7/24/09

work on Reply Brief.

2.0

7/25/09

work on Reply Brief

2.2

7/26/09

work on Reply Brief

1.8

7/27/09

work on Reply Brief

1.5

7/26/09

work on Reply Brief

2.8

7/06/09

15.6

Total Time:
Legal Services
Previous Balance
Payments Received

$

3,666.00
16,301.00
(00.00)

Amount Due

$

19,967.00
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THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, ESQ.
409 N. MAIN ST.
RAILEY, IDAHO 83333

Mr. Steve Jasso
20 Quigley Gulch Rd
Hailey, 1D 83333
September 1, 2009
Statement of Account
Re: Camas County, Idaho
Fricke Creek Subdivision
Services
8/19/09

Hours

prepare, travel and attend hearing on
Petition for Judical Review in Fairfield
Total Time:

.. Legal. Services.

Previous Balance
Payments Received

Amount Due

\

4.5

4.5
$ .,

1 , 05 7 • :;; O.
19,967.00
( 00.00)

$' 21,024.50

Benjamin W. Worst. ISB#5639
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
371-A Walnut Avenue North
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 622-6699
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116

benworst@cox.net
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Camie Goninge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

**"'**
STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Petitioner,
v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

CURTIS AND CAMJE GORRlNGE, husband
and wife,
Petitioners,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Consolidated Cases:
Case No. CV 2009-14
Case No. CV-2009-15
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

)

v.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife ("Gorringes"), by

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- I

~9£l

and drrough Benjamin W. Worst of the law finn Benjamin W. Worst, P.C., their attorney of
record, and submit this Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to IRCP 54 (d) and
(e), IAR 40 & 41, Idaho Code Section 12-117, and other applicable rules and statutes.
The Gorringes respectfully request attorney fees in the following amount, and submit that
said attorney fees are reasonable and based upon the time, labor and hourly rate set forth in the
Affidavit of Benjamin W. Worst in Support of Memorandwn of Attorney Fees and Costs filed
herewith, summarized as follows:

Hours

Attorney
Benjamin W. Worst

82.9

Rate

Amount

$200/hr

$16,580.00

The Gorringes respectfully request costs as a matter of right as set forth in the Affidavit of
Benjamin W. Worst in Support ofMemorandwn of Attorney Fees and Costs filed herewith,
summarized as follows:
Filing Fee:
Payment to County Clerk for administrative record:
Total

$88.00
$120.00
$208.00

The Gorringes are entitled to an award of said attorney fees pursuant Idaho Code Section
12 -117 because they are the prevailing party and the Respondent acted without a reasonable basis
in fact or law.

DATED this ;Xday of

a lk

,2009.

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.c.
Attorney At Law

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

11

day of

aij..J

,2009, I caused a

true and correct copy of the foregoing MEM()""RANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND

COSTS to be served by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following:

Mr. Paul Fitzer. Esq.
Moore, Smith, Buxton & Turke
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
p4'Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

James W. Phillips
The Roark Law Firm
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333

( ) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 788-3918

0f

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
Attorney At Law

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 3
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Benjamin W. Worst, ISB#5639

BENJAMIN W. WORST, p.e.
371-A Walnut Avenue North
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340
Telephone: (208) 622-6699
Facsimile: (208) 726-8116

benwQrst@cox.net
Attorney for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS

*** **
)

STEPHEN V. JASSO,

Consolidated Cases:

)
Petitioner,

)

)

v.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,

a political

subdivision of the State of Idaho

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-14
Case No. CV-2009-15

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W.
WORST IN SUPPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE. husband
and wife,

Petitioners.

v.
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho

Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS - 1

State ofIdaho

)

County of Blaine

)

) 88
I, BENJAMIN W. WORST, being duly swom upon oath, depose and state:

1.

I am the cOWlsel of record for Petitioners Curtis and Carnie Gorringe (the

"Gorringes") in the above-entitled action and arn the President of the law fum Benjamin W.
Worst, P.C.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein and am competent

to testify thereto if called upon to do so.
3.

I am duly admitted to the practice oflaw in Idaho and maintain an office at

371-A Walnut Avenue North, Ketchum, Idaho 83340.
4.

I make this affidavit pursuant to IRCP Rules 54(d) & 54(e), IAR Rules 40

& 41, Idaho Code § 12-117 and other applicable rules and statutes in support of the Goninges'

Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees.
5.

On or about February 1,2009, the Gorringes retained this law firm to

represent them in this action.
6.

The Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review in this action dated October

2,2009, states that, ''the petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs attributable

to the petition for judicial review only."
7.

Although I began working for the Goninges in the administrative phase of

this matter on or about February 1.2009, I did not begin work directly attributable to the petition
for judicial review until approximately March 2. 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS - 2

8.

To establish the outstanding amount due and owing from a client, this law

finn prepares time slips describing the particular legal services performed. together with the
particular date such legal services were rendered, as well as designating the amount of time spent
on the particular matter. The time slips are filed electronically for each client and on a periodic
basis; the time is totaled, then multiplied by the applicable hourly rate to arrive at a bill for legal
services perfonned as well as costs incurred.
9.

True and correct copies of the Gorringes' billing swmnaries showing the

date, hours, amount and description of work performed are attached hereto as Exhibit A, and are
incorporated herein by reference.
10.

Since March 2.2009. the date upon which I began work directly

attributable to the petition for judicial review,the Gorringes have incurred attorney fees in the

sum of $16,580.00 (SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY DOLLARS).
11.

The sum of$16,580.00 claimed for attorney fees is a reasonable sum,

actually and necessarily incurred as provided below.
12.

The costs by right include $88.00 for the filing fee in this action and

$120.00 paid to the County Clerk for the administrative record.
13.

The hours that I worked for the Gorringes and the hourly rate and the fees

and costs charged to the Gorringes are as follows:

Attorney

Hours

Rate

Amount

Benjamin W. Worst

82.9

$200/hr

$16,580.00

Costs by Right

$

208.00

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS - 3

14.

15.

The legal services that I perfonned for the Gorringes included:
a)

Numerous telephone and in-person conferences with the client;

b)

Correspondence and telephone conferences with the attorneys for
the Respondent, the attorney for Petitioner Jasso, the Clerk of the
Court and the pennit holder, Patrick Dunn.

c)

Legal research, review of statutes, review of caselaw and review of
the administrative record and documents.

d)

Preparation of pleadings and motions including without limitation
the Petition for Judicial Review, the Statement of Issues,
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Augment, Objection to
Record, Trial Brief and Rebuttal Brief.

e)

Preparation for and personal appearances at two hearings in Hailey,
Idaho and one hearing in Fairfield. Idaho.

The time and labor that I spent performing the legal services on behalf of

the Gorringes are set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto. This case was novel in that it never
should have happened. Throughout the administrative phase of this matter, the Gorringes and
other neighbors repeatedly raised the same issues and arguments raised in the petition for judicial
review; however, Camas County ignored them. The skill required to successfully pursue a
judicial review action under IRCP 84 is substantial. An attorney bringing such an action must
understand the procedural complexities ofIRCP 84, the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act,

the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act and land use and development. I obtained this skill
through working full-time as a statutory city attorney for more than four years and through twelve
years of practicing in the field of land use and real estate law. I am not personally aware of any
attorneys who pursue land use-related petitions for judicial review for less than $200 per hour
and I am aware of several who charge more than $300 per hour. I performed the services on a
contingent fee basis because my clients have very limited financial resources. The time
limitations involved in a petition for judicial review are significant because IRep 84 imposes a

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS - 4
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28 day statute of limitations. Due to such constraint, I was forced to push other projects back in
order to complete the substantial amount of legal work required to file the petition on time.
There was no claim for monetary damages in this case; however, the result obtained is excellent.
My professional relationship with the Gorringes began on or about February 1,2009 and has

been limited exclusively to this matter. I am not aware ofllie awards in similar cases; however, I
can state that I performed tins work as efficiently as possible using Casemaker for automated
research in lieu of Westlaw and relying upon Jim Phillips, counsel for Petitioner Jasso, to share
his research, documents and specific knowledge of the record and applicable ordinances which
he obtained by traveling to Fairfield, Idaho. It is my opinion that the attorney fees charged in this
action have been fair, reasonable and necessarily incurred to obtain the Order, and each of the
factors set forth in I.R. c.P. 54(e)(3) weigh in favor of an award of attorney fees by the Court in
the sum of $16,580.00 (SIXTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY DOLLARS), and
costs as a matter of right in the amount of $208.00 (TWO HUNDRED EIGHT DOLLARS).
FURTIIER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH N

(;s
.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

t h fI.4day of October, 2009.

:-fr~ ..t
,

No~ Public fhdahOv
t{ .
Res1dmg a t 2 ' . l A.. j!.!"1 7
My conunission expires 1(.' '- 2-,1- I

s=:

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
true and COlTect copy of the foregoing

lJ.,.~day of

a:-LV

.2009, I caused a

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN

SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mr. Paul Fitzer, Esq.
Moore~ Smith. Buxton & Turke
950 West Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, Idaho 83702

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202

o

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

James W. Phillips
The Roark Law Finn
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333

(iFacsimile: (208) 788-3918

BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
Attorney At Law

AFFIDAVIT OF BENJAMIN W. WORST IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEY FEES &, CQSTS - 6
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BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, ID 83340

Curtis & Connie Gorringe

RR #1; Box 1177
Fairfield ID 83327

Professional Services
HOIJr'S

Amount

1.10

220.00

3/11/2009 Telephone conference with counsel (2x) for Jasso

0.40

80.00

3/1212009 Telephone conference with client

0.40

80.00

3/13/2009 Telephone conference with client

0.30

60.00

3/1712009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso

0.50

100.00

311812009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso

0.40

80.00

3120/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso; review Jasso Petition; review Rule 84;
review LLUPA and IDAPA; telephone conference with client; telephone conference
with neighbors; draft Petition for Judicial Review; draft Notice of Petition; arrange for
service and filing

5.70

1,140.00

3/3112009 Review file for statement of issues; begin statement of issues

1.20

240.00

4/1/2009 Complete review of file and law; draft Statement of Issues

2.90

580.00

41212009 Review Rule 84; telephone conference with Dunn; draft Acceptance of service and
correspondence to Dunn; complete Statement of Issues; telephone conference with
Clerk of the Court, correspondence to Clerk of the Court

2.80

560.00

413/2009 Telephone conference with counsel Jasso regarding consolidation and Motion to

0.50

100.00

31212009 Telephone conference with Gorringe and Konrad regarding description of judicial
review

Compel; draft corresponodence to client

'Jeu.J: t
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4/8/2009 Review Jasso Motion to bifurcate; Motion to Consolidate and Motion to Compel; email
to counsel for Jasso; telephone conference with client regarding representation

0.50

100.00

4/10/2009 Telephone conference with and email to Dunn regarding Acceptance of Service; draft
consent to consolidation; review Idaho Appellate Rules

0.40

80.00

4/13/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding consolidation and
bifurcation; review Jasso motions; draft consent to bifurcation; review Rule 84
regarding lodging of overdue record; correspondence to Camas County Clerk
regarding lodging of record

0.80

160.00

4/15/2009 Telephone conference with client; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso
regarding Motions from opposing counsel; review Motions from opposing counsel;
review 07-6510; telephone conference with Clerk of Camas County regarding record

1.10

220.00

4/20/2009 Legal research regarding stay of judicial review vs tolling of application under
67-6510; prepare for hearing on Motion to Stay; attend hearing on Motion to Stay,
Bifurcate Issues of Law, consolidate cases and compel preparation of offical record

4.20

840.00

4/2212009 Review Orders regarding' consolidation, bifurcation and stay; review record; prepare
objections to record

5.10

1,020.00

4/23/2009 Complete objection to Record; review Jasso objections; review service upon Dunn;
telephone conference with Dunn; correspondence to Clerk of the Court; draft Proof of
Service for Dunn

1.60

320.00

0.30

60.00

5/12/2009 Review email from Dunn and respond to Dunn

0.10

20.00

5/13/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding settlement offers and
Motions to Compel; telephone conference with client; email to Dunn

0.70

140.00

5/18/2009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding Motion to Compel; review
Motion to Compel

0.20

40.00

5/22/2009 Review Motion to Compel, setting of record and response to Motion to Compel;
review case law regarding record

1.50

300.00

5/27/2009 Review pleadings from counsel for Jasso and telephone conference with email client

0.30

60.00

5/29/2009 Review Jasso Reply and telephone conference with counsel for Jasso

0.40

BO.OO

6/812009 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Compel and settle recording; review Notice of
Hearing; attend hearing on Motions

2.10

420.00

6/15/2009 Review Affidavit of Butlin; confirm dates of application and publication of adVance
legal research regarding trial brief; begin draft of brief

3.10

'620.00

6116/2009 Draft Trial Brief

2.30

460.00

6117/2009 Draft Trial Brief

0.90

1BO.00

6/19/2009 Legal research; draft brief

2.BO

560.00

5/512009 Review Order regarding Petition; draft correspondence to Camas County CierI<
regarding overdue filing of record; review Rule 84 regarding overdue record

\

0n \Qry l i l l
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612212009 Legal research regarding remedies

0.60

120.00

612312009 Legal research; draft trial brief

4.70

940.00

612412009 legal research; draft trial brief

6.40

1,280.00

612512009 Revise trial brief

2.20

440.00

6/2912009 Finalize Brief in support of petition for judicial review

6.30

1,260.00

7/1612009 Telephone conference with counsel for Jasso regarding Motion to Augment;
telephone conference and email to opposing counsel regarding did not receive
pleadings .

0.20

40.00

7/1712009 Draft Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Augment; review Rule B4 and Order;
review Motion to Augment and But/in Affidavit; correspondence to opposing counsel

1.20

240,00

712512009 Review Affidavit of Butling, second Affidavit and Response to Objection; review
County's Response to Trial Brief; draft Rebuttal Brief; Response to Opposition; draft
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Argument

6,80

1,360.00

712612009 Review Jasso Rebuttal Brief; complete Gorringe Rebuttal Brief; legal research

1.70

340.00

8/1712009 Prepare for oral argument; telephone conference with counsel for Jasso

1.10

220.00

811812009 Prepare hearing; review briefs

1.90

380.00

8/1912009 Final preparations for hearings; attend hearing in Fairfield

4.80

960.00

812712009 Telephone conference with counsel

OAO

80.00

regarding remedies

Grand Total

Billable
Ullbillable
Total

0,00

16580.00
0.00

82.90

16580.00

82.90

Paul Fitzer, ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHID.
950 W. Bannock St.. Suite 520
Boise. ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
Attorneysfi>r Re!J]Jondent Camas County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY

STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Petitioner,
Vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondent

)
)

CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,

Consolidated Case Nos.
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15

RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISALLOW
PETITIONERS' COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

)
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

vs.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho.

)
)
)

Respondent.

)

COME NOW Respondent Camas County and objects to Petitioners Stephen V. Jasso and
Curtis and Camie Gorringe's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) Respondent moves this Court to disallo\v such costs and attorney fees for the
reasons to be fully set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to DisallO\v

RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PETITIONERS CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE - I

~3o'l

Costs and Attomeys Fees filed concurrently herewith. Oral argument is not requested on this
motion.
Dated this 11,...day of October, 2009.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE.
CHARTERED

BY: _ _-llJ-I--I-_-:::::-"--===

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 'l '?day of October, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~ailed

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST. P.c.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

FAXED
Hand-delivered

......-.-rvIailed
FAXED
Hand-deli vered

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey. Idaho 83333

RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PETITIONERS CURTIS AND. ~MIE GORRINGE - 2
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Paul Fitzer. ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise. ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202

Attorneys/hr Respondent Camas County

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
Vs.

Consolidated Case Nos.
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15

)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Respondent
CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,
Petitioners,
vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State ofIdaho.
Respondent.
I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S
MOTION TO DISALLOW COSTS
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to IRCP 54(d)(6) and 54(e)(6) the County objects to attorney fees and costs
identified in Petitioners' fees and costs memorandums and affidavits. Petitioners' claims for costs
should be disallowed and its claim for attorney's fees should be denied or reduced for the following
reasons:

OISGJ(~

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PETITIONERS CURTIS AND CAMIE GORRINGE - I

309

I AL

II.
A.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

ATTORNEY FEES
Petitioners' claims for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117 are excessive.

duplicative, unreasonable and not limited to only those costs and fees attributable to the petition for
review. The fees requested are extraordinarily excessive given the time and labor required and the
lack of novelty and difficulty in interpreting subdivision code provisions. Petitioners seeks fees
totaling 171 hours and $37,604.50 in fees. This is more than a month of full time work dedicated to
this case alone.
In particular, the Petitioners seek an excessive amount for merely contacting each other or
reviewing each others work product I . More importantly, even a cursory review aptly demonstrates
that much of each attorney's work product is nearly identical to the other, which combined with this
excessive "review" of each other's work product, demonstrates that one or both Petitioners merely
duplicated the other's work product. Not only are the amounts excessive, unreasonable, and even
inconsistent with one another. the work product is simply duplicative.

The fees based upon

communication between the attorneys and reviewing each other's work product should be reduced to
zero. Fees based upon work product should be reduced by fifty percent.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party only
where the court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
"A party is not entitled to attorney fees if the issue is one offirst impression in Idaho .... Attorney's

fees are also inappropriate if the City presented a legitimate question for this Court to address." Lane
Ranch Partnership r. Cit)'
Kootenai Afedica/ Or.

1'.

(~lSlln

Valley. 145 Idaho 87. 91. 175 P.3d 776. 780 (2007): See also

Bonner COllnty. 141 Idaho 7.10.105 P.3d 667. 670 (2004). If the answer

I See Worst Affidavit: 311. 3'17. 3'18. 3/20. 43, 4 8. 4il3. 415. 5/13. 518.5127.5'29. 7 i 16. 7126. 8 i 27: See
i

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
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"was by no means obvious" attorney fees are inappropriate. A'aylor Farms

t·.

Latah County, 144

Idaho 806, 810, 172 P.3d 108 L 1085 (2007). "Where an agency acts without authority, it is acting
without a reasonable basis in fact or law". Id.; Magic Valley Sand & Gravel. 140 Idaho at 120, 90
P.3d at 345. "However, if an agency's actions are based upon a 'reasonable, but erroneous
interpretation of an ambiguous statute,' then attorney fees should not be awarded." Id. citing Russet

Valley Produce, Inc. Idaho Potato Comm 'n v. Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 661,904
P.3d566, 573 (1995); Coxv. Dep't. o.fIns.. Stateo.fJdaho, 121 Idaho 143, 148,823 P.2d 177, 182
(CLApp. 1991).
Attorney fees are further not appropriate unless all defenses and claims were asserted
frivolously or without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Turbo W Corpac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626,
809 P.2d 487 (1991). Where some of the claims or issues are subject to argument, attorney fees
are inappropriate. The County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to defend itself in this cause
of action based upon, but not limited to, the following:
1.

Cul-De-Sac vs. Access Road. The Court concluded that the applicant's (Patrick Dunn)

subdivision application did not comply with the County's Article IV. Section C(7) prohibiting culde-sac streets over 500 feet in length. However, the County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to
defend its position that there are alternatives to a cul-de-sac available within the County. The County
has the authority to approve a dead-end access road including, but not limited to, Stub streets where
it is anticipated. like here. that future connectivity may be a viable option. (A11icle IV. Section C(3».

2.

The Access is not required to be a Public Road. The Petitioner asserted that that the

applicant's subdivision does not comply with Article IV. Section C(9) which prohibits private roads

Phillips Affidavit: Jl17.

4~.

413. 4115. 4'22. 4'n. 5/5. 5 11.5/18.6 1 15.6/16.6'14.
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except within Planned Unit Developments. The Court admittedly provided that this ordinance "may
be ambiguous as applied because it is unclear whether it means no private roads in subdivisions, or
no private roads anywhere:' Ifit is ambiguous 2 then the County has a reasonable basis in fact and
law to defend the Petitioner's assertions that Article IV. Section C(9) of Camas County's
Subdivision Ordinance pertains not only to the "Design Standards" within a subdivision, but to all
roads including access roads. While the County can of course require all roads within a proposed
subdivision to be dedicated to the public, it could not require an applicant to dedicate property not
his own and outside of his subdivision to the public as well. The Court sided with the County on this
issue and as such the County did not proceed without a reasonable basis in fact and law. (Attorney
fees are further not appropriate unless all defenses and claims were asserted frivolously or without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. Turbo W Corpac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626, 809 P.2d 487 (1991 )).

3.

Adjudication of an Easement is beyond the authority of the County
The County acted with a reasonable basis in fact and law by requiring the Applicant to

comply with Article V, Section B( 1) which requires that a proposed subdivision have access to a
public road; i.e. a landlocked subdivision is precluded. The Board did so specifically requiring that
the Subdivision must have access to Baseline Road as a condition of approval before building
permits. certificates of occupancy, etc could be issued.
The County reasonably refuted Petitioners' assertion that the County is in fact required to
adjudicate the nature of the easement helore granting preliminary plat approval or simply deny the
land use application on the basis of a neighbor's objection. The County does not possess the legal

1 '"However. if an agency's actions are based upon a ·reasonable. but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.' then attorney fees should not be awarded." Emphasis added !d. citing Russ('l I 'a/fcl' ProdIIL·c. Inc. Idaho
Potato COIllIl1 'nl', Russct "a/fcy Producc. Inc .. 117 Idaho 654,661. 904 P.3d 566. 573 (1995);
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authority to provide a legal interpretation of such easement as such would be an ultra-vires act.
"Where an agency acts without authority, it is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or lav,:"'.Id.;

/v1agic Valley Sand & Gravel. 140 Idaho at 120,90 P.3d at 345.
More importantly, the applicant asserts that the easement is public in nature; that the
applicant and all future assigns have use of the road. Coupled with the easement itself, the applicant
asserted that on its face, the easement does not indicate that it is private in nature. There also does
not appear to have any limiting language within its terms. Thus, the County did not have grounds to
deny the application merely because the neighbors contest that the easement is private in nature.
Perhaps the neighbor is correct. Should the neighbors seek declaratory relief that the
easement is private, then the applicant has not complied with the County's condition of approval.
The applicant is on notice that this could be an issue. If the applicant chooses to proceed with its
project, it does so at its own risk. But this does not enable nor require the County to summarily deny
an otherwise valid application by virtue of a neighbor's interpretation of an easement. The County
cannot unreasonably restrict an individual's property rights merely because a neighbor offers an
alternative interpretation of an admittedly vague easement. The County is simply not vested with the
authority to adjudicate this dispute. Until clear evidence is shown that the easement is private in
nature, i.e. adjudication by a Court, the County will not unreasonably restrict private property where
an easement is not plainly invalid on its face.
The C0U11 mirrors this analysis. The easement is part of the official record and thus before
the C0U11 too. The Court recognized the "difficulty oflitigation over the question whether increased
use of an easement unreasonably increases the burden on a servient estate". The Court concluded
that the issue \'\'as not before the Court nor proper in a judicial revie\v proceeding. If it is not proper
in ajudicial revie\v proceeding, the County has a reasonable basis in fact and law that it is not proper
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at the administrative level.
4.

Flood Plain: The Plaintiff contended that the subdivision does not comply with Article VI,

Section H which requires that "any proposed subdivision that is located within a floodplain" is
thereafter subject to the myriad of additional floodplain requirements. The County reasonably
determined that this particular code provision is not applicable and in fact need not be addressed at
all because FEMA has not, as yet, adopted a floodplain map for this area.

As such, there is no

evidence in the record nor could there be that this subdivision is located in the floodplain. The
County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law in not requiring the applicant to go to the
considerable expense of providing floodplain studies, environmental impact statements, and other
such information nor addressing the absence of it as the ordinance provision is simply not as yet
applicable. The limit to the County's authority at this juncture is as provided in the approved plat
which identifies the location of Fricke Creek and specifies that building envelopes must be at least
200' from the creek. Further, there is no showing that the Petitioners have suffered any harnl by
virtue of the absence of such environmental studies.
5.

Peculiarized Harm: The County had a reasonable basis in fact or law to assert that the

Petitioners have not suffered harm by virtue of an alleged governmental error.

Petitioners must

demonstrate that its personal and substantial rights have been violated by virtue of the governmental
conduct. The only arguable issue that might cause peculiarized hann to the Petitioners is the nature
of the easement which. as stated. is not within the prevue of the County'sjurisdiction. Should it be
determined by a court of law that the easement in question is private in nature. then the Applicant
will not have complied with the conditions of approval of the County Board.
6.

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Layv: Petitioners both objected to the Findings of Fact

Conclusions of Law dated March 3, 2009 as it purportedly was signed after February 23. 2009; the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CAMAS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISALLOW
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date the Board of Commissioners allegedly entered their decision. The County had a reasonable
basis in fact and law to defend itself and its findings as part of the record on the basis that the
findings are routinely approved and therefore final at the following meeting: not the date of the
hearing.
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to substantively defend the Findings. The
findings need not be a resuscitation of the entirety of the Subdivision Code but merely a reasoned
statement pertaining only to the applicable provisions. The County specifically addressed the
hammerhead dead-end street as acceptable if developed to county specifications and approved by the
Road and Bridge Department. Where an easement is purported to access a public road for the benefit
of the applicant's property, and there is no clear evidence to the contrary on the face of the easement
the County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to refuse to adjudicate the nature of an
easement or deny an application solely on the basis of testimony from a neighbor. The County can
reasonably conclude that the easement must comply with the applicable code provisions providing
the subdivision access to a public road and should the neighbor contest the nature of the easement via
declarative judgment action and prevaiL the applicant bears this risk.
7.

Denial of a Written Transcribable Record:

As to Floodplain requirements that are

inapplicable to the proposed development and provisions pertaining to cul-de-sacs, findings offact
need not address inapplicable code provisions. The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to
request a transcript of the record. The Court in denying the County's request for a transcribable
record precluded the County from presenting evidence that it did in fact consider such issues in
dispute such as the cul-de-sac and floodplain as ancillary and inapplicable issues which need not be
addressed in the findings. These were the "criteria and standards it considered relevant. ... [with]
detailed facts, and ... rational for its decision:'.
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B.

BILL OF COSTS
Respondent requests that Petitioners be awarded only those costs associated with the petition

for judicial review as stated in the Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Revie\v entered on October 2nd •
2009.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. the County requests that attorney fees and costs be denied.
Dated this '2. 'lctay of October. 2009.
HARTERED
By:_----,f.-6L~"'____,'--_==----

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thet--2...day of October. 2009. I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES by the method indicated below. and addressed to the following:

~Mailed

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST. P.C.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum. Idaho 83340

FAXED
Hand -delivered

~-

Mailed
FAXED
Hand-delivered

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm. LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey. Idaho 83333
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JAMES W. PHILLIPS
THE ROARK LAW FIRM
Attorneys at Law
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Idaho 83333
208/788-2427
ISB # 1520
Attorneys for petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C~~S
STEPHEN V. JASSO,

)
)

Petitioner,

Consolidated
Case Nos. CV-2009-14
and CV-2009-15

)
)
)
)

vs.

REQUEST FOR HEARING
ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW PETITIONERS'
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

)

}

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO,
)
a political subdivision of the )
state of Idaho,
)
)
)
)

Respondent

-------------------------------)
CURTIS. AND CAMIE GORRINGE,
husband and wife,
petitioners,
vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a
political subdivision of the
state of Idaho,
Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

-------------------------------)
COMES NOW, Stephen V. Jasso, the above-named Petitioner,
by

and

through

James

attorneys of record,

W.

Phillips

of

Tr1e

Roark

Law

Firm,

his

and requests the court set a hearing on the

Respondent Camas County'

5

Motion To Disallo\v Petitioners' Costs and

L'10TION FOR HEARING ON RESPONDENT I S MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1

Attorney Pees. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 54(e)(7) IRCP
and on the grounds { in part, that Memorandum In Support of
Respondent Camas County's Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney
Fees is inaccurate and misleading, and that amount of costs and
attorney fees set forth in the Petitioner Jasso'S Memorandum of
Cost and Attorney Fees and supporting affidavit are proper "and
should be awarded.
~
DATED this ~&-~ay

MOTION FOR HEARING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO
DISALLOW COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z- ~ay of October I 2009 I I mailed
the foregoing document by USPS first class postage prepaid to the
following:
Mr. Paul Fitzer
Moore, Smith Buxton & Tucke, Chtd
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 520
Boise, ID 83702
attorney for Camas County, Idaho
Ben Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum ID 83340
attorney for Curtis and Carnie Gorringe
"-

Dated:

ttl· 2. T .~Ott

JaQ4JMp?v2 Q~ ~
attorney for Petitioner
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ISB No. 5675
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: 208/33111800
Fax: 208/33111202
PAUL FITZER,

~Ll
I .~

:!:;:::!r-~-~_--'_!
j.

~Oei!

Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant Camas County, Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Peti tioner-Respondent,
Vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Respondent-Appellant.

CURTIS and CAMIE GORRINGE, husband
and wife,
Petitioner-Respondent,
Vs.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
subdivision of the State ofIdaho,
Respondent-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Consolidated Case Nos.
CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15
NOTICE OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, STEPHEN V. JASSO and his attorney,
JAMES W. PHILLIPS, THE ROARK LAW FIRM, 409 N. MAIN STREET, HAILEY, IDAHO,
83333, and RESPONDENTS CURTIS and CAMIE GORRINGE and their attorney, BENJAMIN W.
WORST, BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.C., P.O. BOX 6962, KETCHUM, IDAHO, 83340, ANDTHE
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellant, Camas County, Idaho, appeal against the above-named

Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment certified pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)
entitled Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review entered in the above-entitled action on the 2nd day of
October, 2009, Honorable Judge Robert J. Elgee presiding.
2.

The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and

order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule
11(a)(l),I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to

assert in the appeal is as follows:
(a)

Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling

that provisions of the International Fire Code were not applicable in Camas County and that the
Camas County Subdivision Ordinance "trumps" the International Fire Code.
(b)

Whether the District Court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the

County Board in determining that the proposed access road in the Subdivision constituted a "cul-desac" as opposed to other "dead end" streets including stub streets, hammerheads, etc.
(c)

Whether the District Court erred in determining that the County is vested with

the authority and required to provide a legal interpretation of an easement between two private parties
over property not the subject of the subdivision application.
(d)

Whether the District Court erred in determining that information pertaining to

flood plains were required.
(e)

Whether the District Court erred in bifurcating issues of fact and law denying

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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the County's request for a transcribeable record which would have provided evidence of disputed
questions of fact and issues oflaw.
(f)

Whether the District Court erred in holding that the County's decision

approving the application violates Camas County's own ordinance;
(g)

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County did not comply with

the statutory requirements pursuant Idaho Code §67-6535.
(h)

Whether the District Court erred in finding that Petitioners' substantial rights

were prejudiced by virtue of the challenged conduct.
(i)

Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is

entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-117.
(j)

Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under

Idaho Code § 12-117.
4.

No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the

following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule 25,
Idaho Appellate Rules supplemented by the following:

6.

(a)

April 20th , 2009, hearing

(b)

June 8th , 2009, hearing (held in Blaine County), and

(c)

August 19th , 2009, hearing.

Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Idaho

Appellate Rule 28 be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the following documents
be included in the clerk's record:
(a)

03/20/2009
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Appeal or Petition for Judicial Review;

(b)

03/27/2009 - Order Re: Petition for Judicial Review Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 84;

(c)

04/03/2009

(d)

0411 0/2009 - Motion to Consolidate Petitions for Judicial Review;

(e)

0411 0/2009

Motion of Compel Filing of Record with Agency as Required by

(f)

0411 0/2009

Motion to Bifurcate Issue of Law;

(g)

0411 0/2009

Statement of Issues;

(h)

04114/2009 - Notice of Filing of Agency Record;

(i)

0411412009

Record of Proceedings;

I.R.C.P. 84(f);

Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion to Consolidate Petitions,

Bifurcation of Issues and Motion to Stay Cause of Action Pending Mediation;
(j)

04/14/2009

(k)

04/22/2009 - Court Minutes

(1)

04/23/2009 - Objection to Record;

(m)

04/2312009 - Objection to Proposed Record of Proceedings as Filed by

(n)

05106/2009

Motion to Appear Telephonically;

Respondent;
Proposed Order re: Motion to Consolidate Petitions for Judicial

Review; Motion to Bifurcate Issues of Law, and Motion to Stay Cause of Action Pending Mediation;
(0)

05/1912009

(p)

0512112009 - Respondents' Response to Petitioner's Motion for Order to Settle

Motion to Compel Settling and Lodging Record with Court;

and Lodge Agency Record;
(q)

06/0812009 - Notice of Lodging Agency Record;

(r)

06/09/2009 - Court Minutes;

(s)

06/10/2009
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Procedural Orders and Order Settling the Record;

(t)

06112/2009 - Affidavit of Dwight Butlin;

(u)

06/29/2009

Petitioner Gorringe's Brief;

(v)

06/29/2009

Petitioner Jasso's Opening Brief;

(w)

06/2912009

Motion to Augment Record;

(x)

07/0112009 - Motion to Augment Record Rule 84(1);

(y)

07/0112009

Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Respondent's Motion to

Augment Record;
(z)

07/07/2009 - Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Augment

(aa)

07/20/2009 - Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Motion to

Record;

Augment Record;
(bb)

07/20/2009

(cc)

07/2112009 - Response to Petitioner's Objection to Motion to Augment

(dd)

07/2112009

Affidavit of Dwight Butlin in Support of Respondent's Motion to

(ee)

07/27/2009

Petitioner Jasso's Reply;

(ft)

0712812009 - Request for Setting of Oral Argument;

(gg)

07/28/2009

Response;

Record;

Augment Record;

Memorandum in Opposition to Camas County's Response to

Petitioner's Motion to Augment Record;
(hh)

07/28/2009

Petitioner Gorringe's Rebuttal Brief;

(ii)

08/19/2009

Court Minutes;

(jj)

0812112009

Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record;
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(kk)

1010212009 - Order Upon Hearing for Judicial Review;

(11)

10/09/2009 - Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees;

(mm) 10109/2009 - Affidavit in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney
Fees;
(nn)

10/13/2009 - Memorandum Costs and Attorney Fees;

(00)

1011312009

Affidavit of Benjamin W. Worst in Support of Memorandum of

Attorney Fees and Costs;
(pp)

1012312009

Respondent Camas County's Motion to Disallow Petitioners'

Costs and Attorney's Fees;
(qq)

10/23/2009 - Memorandum in Support of Respondent Camas County's Motion

to Disallow Costs and Attorney's Fees; and
(IT)

10129/2009 - Request for Hearing on Respondent's Motion to Disallow

Petitioners' Cost and Attorney Fees.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including
charts, graphs, maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether
hearing or trial, be included as exhibits to the record.
7.

I certify that:
(a)

A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Rollie Bennett
Clerk of the Court
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327
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Susan Israel
Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County
P.O. Box 430
Fairfield, Idaho 83327
(b)

Maureen Newton
Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County
P.O. Box 368
Rupert, Idaho 83350

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the

clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofldaho acting in his official capacity, and
Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for any services
rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official capacity is a party.

(c)

The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section

67-2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state
officer in the performance of his official duties.
(d)

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule

20, I.A.R.
Respectfully submitted this

I L--day of November, 2009.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON

&

TURCKE, CHTD.

espl(')fii:lelllW\ppe llant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Le.ay of November, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Benjamin W. Worst
BENJAMIN W. WORST, P.e.
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Idaho 83340

James W. Phillips
Roark Law Firm, LLP
409 North Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333
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~ailed
Facsimile
Hand-delivered

_t_//

Mailed
Facsimile
Hand-deli vered

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
STEPHEN V. JASSO,
Petitioner-Respondent,

)
)
)

V.

)
)

CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
Subdivision of the State of Idaho,

)

Respondent-Appellant.

CURTIS and CAMIE GORRINGE, husband
And wife.
Petitioner-Respondent,

v
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, a political
Subdivision of the State of Idaho,
Respondent -Appelia nt.

Consolidated Case Nos.

CV-2009-14 & CV-2009-15
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
OF APPEAL

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Appeal from: Fifth Judicial District, Camas County. Honorable Robert Elgee presiding.
Case number from court: CV 2009-14 and CV 2009-15
Order or Judgment appealed from: October 2,2009 Order Upon Hearing For Judicial Rc"icw
Attorney for Appellant: Paul Fitzer
Attorney for Respondents: James W. Phillips & Benjamin W. Worst
Appealed by: Respondent
Appealed against: Petitioners
Notice of Appeal Filed November 13,2009
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed:
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed:
Appellate fee paid: None-Exempt
Respondent's Request for additional clerk's record filed:

Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcript filed:
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes
Name of Reporter: Susan Israel, 201 2nd Ave S, Ste 106, Hailey, ID 83333
Maureen Ne\\1on. P.O. Box 368, Rupert, ID 83350
Request for additional reporter's transcript:
Dated: December 31, 2009
F.R. BENNETT
Clerk of the District Court

By:~~~~~~~~~~

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY
Steven V. Jasso,
Petitioner-Respondent,
V.
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO
a political Subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Respondent-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT CASE NO.
37258-2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)

Curtis and Carnie Gorringe,
husband and wife,
Peti tioner-Respondent
V.
CAMAS COUNTY,
A political Subdivision of the
State ofIdaho
Respondent-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

L Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record
and the Court Reporter's Transcript, and any exhibits offered or admitted to each of the
Attorneys of Record in this case as follows:
Paul Fitzer
950 W. Bannock
Suite 520
Boise, Id 83702

James Phillips
409 N. Main St.
Hailey, Id 83333

Benjamin Worst
P.O. Box 6962
Ketchum, Id 83340

IN WITNESS WHEROF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court this
day of March. 2010.

M

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Clerk of the District Court

B?6~\).~

Bobbie D. Walton
Deputy Clerk
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CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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)
)

Respondent-Appellant

)

I, Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. However, the following exhibits will be
retained at the District Court Clerk' s Office and will be made available upon request:
1. Agency's Record

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

INWITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the
seal of the said Court this ~ day of March, 2010.
Clerk of the District Court

B-;S~\:)~

Bobbie D. Walton
Deputy Clerk
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V.
CAMAS COUNTY,
A political Subdivision of the
State of Idaho
Respondent-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Bobbie D. Walton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of Camas, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under
my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings and documents as
are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

I, do further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in the above entitled cause
will be fully lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's
Transcript and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
day of March, 2010.
said Court this

M

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Clerk of the District Court

~\)~
Bobbie D. Walton
Deputy Clerk
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